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RULE, STORY, AND COMMITMENT IN THE TEACHING OF
LEGAL ETHICS
ROGER C. CRAMTON* AND SUSAN

P KONiAK*

INTRODUCTION

Law students, law teachers and practitioners often assume
that legal ethics is mushy pap that the organized profession
requires law students to study for public-relations purposes.
How would it look to the man on the street if we did not require
law students to study legal ethics? Garry Trudeau pointedly expressed this view some years ago in Doonesbury ' A lengthy
series of episodes in that comic strip involved Joame Caucus's
law school experiences. 2 One day in the school cafeteria she
asked her friend, Woody, about the utility of a newly required
course in legal ethics.3 Woody replied: "Nah-all that ethics
stuff is just more Watergate fallout! Trendy lip service to our
better selves!"4
There is historical5 and empircal6 support for Woody's skep* Robert S. Stevens Professor of Law, Cornell Law School.
** Professor of Law, Boston Umversity School of Law.

1. Garry B. Trudeau, Doonesbury (1975), reprinted in THOMAS D. MORGAN &
RONALD D. ROTUNDA, PROBLEMS AND MATERLLS ON PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 1
(6th ed. 1995).
2. See GARRY B. TRUDEAU, THE DOONESBURY CHRONICLES (1975); GARRY B.
TRUDEAU, DOONESBURY'S GREATEST HITS (1978).
3. Trudeau, supra note 1.
4. Id.
5. For recent general discussions of the history of legal ethics teaching, see MICHAEL J. KELLY, LEGAL ETHICS AND LEGAL EDUCATION 1, 5-28 (1980) (stating that
law schools are "inhospitable" places for study of the professional and personal prob-

lems of life as a lawyer); Deborah L. Rhode, Ethics by the Pervasive Method, 42 J.
LEGAL EDUC. 31, 33-38 (1992) (asserting that "[t]he conventional view on most faculties has been that education in professional responsibility is someone else's
responsibility").
For snapshots in time, see George P Costigan Jr., The Teaching of Legal Ethics, 4 AM. L. SCH. REV. 290 (1917); JULIUS STONE, LEGAL EDUCATION AND PUBLIC
RESPONSIBILITY: REPORT AND ANALYSIS OF THE CONFERENCE ON THE EDUCATION OF
LAWYERS FOR THEIR PUBLIC RESPONSIBILITIES, 1956 (1959); LEROY L. LAmBORN, LEGAL ETHICS AND PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: A SURVEY OF CURRENT METHODS OF
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ticism. The thorough empirical study conducted by Ronald
Pipkin in 1975-1976 showed that students perceived courses in
professional responsibility "as requiring less time, as substantially easier, as less well taught, and as a less valuable use of
class time" than other courses. 7 Since 1976, when Pipkin collected his data, the volume and complexity of case law dealing with
the responsibilities of lawyers has exploded; new and more challenging textbooks have been published on the subject;8 and the
subject we refer to as "the law and ethics of lawyering" has become a half-way respectable field of academic scholarship?
Yet despite these changes, legal ethics remains an unloved
orphan of legal education.'0 "Serious scholarship" in legal ethics
is still considered somewhat of an oxymoron." Many law school
faculties remain convinced that the subject is unteachable or beINSTRUCTION IN AMERICAN LAW SCHOOLS (1963); EDUCATION IN THE PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE LAWYER (Donald T. Weckstein ed., 1970); TEACHING PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY: MATERIALS AND PROCEEDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE (Patrick A. Keenan ed., 1979).
6. See Ronald M. Pipkin, Law School Instruction in Professional Responsibility:
A CurricularParadox, 1979 AM. B. FOUND. RES. J. 247, 275 (arguing that law
school experiences "desensitize[] students to legal ethics"). Based on data gathered in
1975-1976, Pipkin's study concluded that the "latent hierarchy" of legal education led
law students to believe that legal ethics courses, because they were not taught in
the Socratic method, were less important and less intellectually demanding. Id. at
262-65; see also KELLY, supra note 5, at 23-28; Rhode, supra note 5, at 39-41.
7. Pipkin, supra note 6, at 257-58.
8. See, e.g., STEPHEN GILLERS, REGULATION OF LAWYERS: PROBLEMS OF LAW AND
ETHICS (4th ed. 1995); GEOFFREY C. HAZARD, JR., SUSAN P. KONIAK & ROGER C.
CRAMTON, THE LAw AND ETHICS OF LAWYERING (2d ed. 1994); DEBORAH L. RHODE &
DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS (2d ed. 1995).
9. Terminology is not unimportant. For years a common name for the subject of
legal ethics has been "Professional Responsibility." This term has two problems: first,
it suggests that the subject is limited to the ABA code bearing that name; second, it
is too easily transformed by students into the nickname "P.R.," which has an unfortunate established cultural meaning as: "public relations." We prefer "law and ethics
of lawyering" as reflecting the full dimensions of the subject. In this Article, for purposes of convenience, we use the shorthand terms "legal ethics" and "ethics" to refer
to our topic.
10. See supra note 5.
11. Many first-tier law schools have no faculty member or at least no senior faculty member whose research centers on questions of legal ethics. See generally
Rhode, supra note 5, at 40 (stating that ethics courses are usually taught by junior
faculty and outside lecturers). In our conversations with members of those faculties,
a persistent refrain is that faculty members see most of the scholarship in this subject as being below the school's standards.
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lieve that it is not worth teaching."2 The lowly status of legal
ethics within the larger law school community is a challenge
facing both those who teach basic or advanced courses in this
subject and those who seek to "mainstream" matters of professional responsibility.
In most law schools today legal ethics occupies a minor academic role as a one- or two-credit required course in the
upperclass years, often taught by adjuncts or by a rotating group
of faculty conscripts." A few law schools, including some of the
more prestigious ones, require virtually no course work explicitly
dealing with what lawyers do, or how the profession is structured and regulated; nor do their curricula require teaching the
legal and ethical norms that govern lawyer conduct.'4 These
schools maintain that instruction in these topics "pervades" the
curriculum, but, when questioned, professors at these schools
often concede that they feel uncomfortable dealing with the

12. See id. at 39-41 (discussing student reactions to ethics courses and the views
of some faculty that the subject is worth teaching but that only the rarest of individuals can make the course work).
13. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
14. As of the academic year 1995-1996, based on statements in academic catalogues and conversations with law school registrars, a number of major law schools
require little or no instruction in legal ethics: Boston University School of Law (no
required course; in the first, second, and third years, three days will be devoted to
lectures and discussion groups concerning professional ethics and responsibility) BOSTON UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW 1994/95 at 17; University of Chicago Law School (a
1.5 credit course is required prior to graduation); Columbia University School of Law
(a five-day intensive course, receiving one credit and graded on a pass-fail basis, is
required at the beginning of the third year) COLUMBIA UNrVERSrrY SCHOOL OF LAW
BULLETIN 1996-97 at 52; Duke University School of Law (a five-day intensive course,
receiving one credit and graded on the same basis as other courses, is required
during the January intersession of the first year) 67 BULLETIN OF DUKE UNIVERSITY
1995-96 THE SCHOOL OF LAW No. 6 at 57; University of Michigan Law School (students are required to have exposure to legal ethics in some manner, either by taking an elective two-credit or three-credit course in the subject, by taking one of a
number of electives that have some legal ethics content, or, in the current year, by
a five-day, one-credit "bridge week" involving all first-year classes and graded on a
pass-fail basis) 23 THE UNERSrrY OF MICHIGAN LAW SCHOOL BULLETIN No. 5 at
12, 38, 50 (1993-95); Stanford Law School (no required course; first-year faculty are
encouraged to include a module on legal ethics in their courses); and Yale Law
School (once-a-week lectures or presentations are required during the first term of
law school on a non-credit, ungraded basis) 90 BULLETIN OF YALE UNIVERSITY No. 8
at 21 (1994-95). Note that none of the seven schools require that each J.D. student
take at least two semester hours of instruction in legal ethics.
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subject and, thus, do not devote substantial course-time to its
study. 5 The "pervasive method," at most schools that profess to
use it, actually is little more than tokenism designed to satisfy
the American Bar Association (ABA) accreditation requirement,
to which we now turn.
The ABA requires each "approved" law school to provide each
student "instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the
legal profession."" First adopted in August, 1973, in the midst
of the Watergate disclosures, this requirement has never been
interpreted and is infrequently referred to or enforced in the
accreditation process.' The professional responsibility requirement is the only substantive teaching requirement imposed by
the ABA.'8

15. See Deborah L. Rhode, Into the Valley of Ethics: Professional Responsibility
and Educational Reform, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 139,
142-43.

16. The ABA Standards for the Approval of Law Schools provide:
The law school shall: . . .require of all candidates for the first professional degree, instruction in the duties and responsibilities of the legal
profession. Such required instruction need not be limited to any pedagogical method as long as the history, goals, structure and responsibilities of

the legal profession and its members, including the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, are all covered. Each law school is encouraged to
involve members of the bench and bar in such instruction.
ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995).
Only 13 states permit a person who has not graduated from an ABA-approved law
school to sit for the bar examination, ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR & THE NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR EXAMINERS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 1995-1996, and in a number of
those states, the opportunities for alternative entry are severely circumscribed. Id.
17. See ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS (1995) (containing
no interpretations of Standard 302(a)(iv)). One of the authors, who was engaged for
a number of years in reviewing ABA accreditation reports, can recall only a few
references to the professional responsibility standard. The other provisions of Standard 302(a)(i)-(iii), requiring that instruction in professional skills be offered, are
discussed at length in every accreditation report and are the subject of several interpretations. The difference in treatment is perhaps due to the ABA practice from
1985-1995 of including a clinical instructor on most site inspection teams, a group
that takes a strong interest in professional skills offerings.
18. The other provisions of the ABA Standards for the Approval of Law Schools
require merely that a school "offer . . . instruction" in certain areas---"subjects generally regarded as the core of the law school curriculum," "one rigorous writing experience," and "professional skills"-but do not require that students actually take such
instruction. ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(i)(iii) (1995). For a recent discussion of developments in law school accreditation, see

1996]

RULE, STORY, AND COMMITMENT

149

Should the ethics teaching requirement be scrapped? We consider that question in Part I. Although we ultimately conclude
the rule should be maintained, we believe this fundamental
question must be asked. Given the disdain many legal academicians have for legal ethics, 9 we find it more than a little curious that no one has suggested abandoning the requirement. In
this Article we ask the question that the skeptics have failed to
ask. In the process we will examine the paradox they have created by failing to suggest the elimination of a requirement that
they are so willing to scorn.
After concluding that the ABA and law schools should require
ethics instruction, we turn in Part II to the questions of what is
appropriate subject matter for ethics courses and when they
should be taught. We emphasize the nature and importance of
rule, story, and commitment throughout this Part, as we do
throughout Part I. With Geoffrey Hazard we co-authored a casebook on legal ethics and the law governing lawyers." Thus our
view on what should be taught will not surprise people familiar
with that book."' In Part II we try to make explicit what is implicit in that other work-the reasons we designed our book as
we did and the lessons we hoped to teach through the material
we included. We also address the question of when students
should learn what concerning legal ethics. We conclude that
some first-year instruction is important, but that, after the first
year, an additional ethics course is also necessary. The required
courses should be supplemented with a well-designed and deliberate effort to-teach ethics through the pervasive method in
upper-level courses.2 2
Finally, in Part III, we turn to the question of who should
teach legal ethics, a neglected topic within which commitment
and character loom large. Although the silence on whether ethics
should remain a required course is somewhat unexpected, the
silence on what kind of person should teach legal ethics is all-too
predictable and, at the same time, enormously problematic. The
Symposium on Accreditation, 45 J. LEGAL EDUC. 415 (1995).
19. See supra notes 11-15 and accompanying text.
20. HAZARD, ET AL., supra note 8.

21. See id.,
22. See generally Rhode, supra note 5.
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subject that dare not speak its name within the walls of the
academy is the character of academics. We believe nonetheless
that we must discuss the character of those who purport to teach
ethics, indeed the character of those who purport to teach anything, and so we end by speaking of character and apologize in
advance if we offend anyone by mentioning the unmentionable.
I. SHOULD THE ETHICS REQUIREMENT BE SCRAPPED?

As we have suggested, there is some truth to the proposition
that the ABA introduced the ethics requirement in response to
the profession's embarrassment about the numbers of lawyers
who acted illegally and otherwise reprehensibly during the Watergate affair.23 This genesis has some important implications,
discussed later, for what should be taught in legal ethics courses.24 Putting historical considerations aside for the time being,
we propose to take a functional approach to the ABA's ethics
requirement. Given the trouble this course presents for law
schools, the difficulty of finding teachers capable of holding
students' respect while teaching the course, and the number of
serious academics who doubt its significance, we wonder whether it might be time to scrap this requirement.
An introductory word about the scope of our inquiry is in
order. One could approach this question by asking what business the ABA has requiring anything of any law school. That is
a legitimate inquiry, worthy of discussion, but we do not address
that question. We begin instead by taking for granted the present structure of law school accreditation with all its attendant
problems. Given that structure and the importance many states
and many people in the profession place on students having
attended an ABA-approved school, we ask whether it makes
sense for the ABA to impose instruction in legal ethics as its one
23. Tom Shaffer attributes the ethics requirement to professional embarrassment
flowing from the Watergate disclosures. See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMERICAN LAWYERS
AND THEIR COMMUNITIES: ETHICS IN THE LEGAL PROFESSION 1-5 (1991). "Legal ethics
owes as much to Richard M. Nixon as it does to the American Bar Association. ...
The criminal politics that destroyed Mr. Nixon's presidency summoned American lawyers to a serious, systematic curiosity about the morals of their craft." Id. at 1. See
also Trudeau, supra note 1.
24. See infra notes 100-01 and accompanying text.
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substantive course requirement.
We start with a simple observation that the rule exists and
that its mere existence carries important implications. As an
initial consideration, repealing a rule is an act of significance. To
provide an example from a different context, Sanford Levinson
has argued that the Fifteenth Amendment to the Constitution is
unnecessary given modern constitutional interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment.' Nonetheless, Levinson recognizes
that his assertion differs greatly from advocating that the Fifteenth Amendment should be repealed. The act of repeal would,
logically, signify some doubt regarding the principle embedded
in the Amendment, accompanying rhetoric notwithstanding. It
seems apparent that any successful move to repeal the Fifteenth
Amendment would inevitably change our interpretation of the
Fourteenth Amendment, and thus our understanding of the
Constitution. Such is the way law works. However superfluous
the Fifteenth Amendment might seem to some constitutional
scholars, one would be hard-pressed to find any of them who
would seriously argue for its repeal.
To suggest repealing the rule requiring legal ethics instruction, based upon no more than the claim that the rule is superfluous, would be unconvincing. A more appropriate and persuasive argument for repeal should rely on a claim that requiring
ethics instruction is intrusive, burdensome, and wrong. Surely,
one might hope, we can amend error'and repeal the rule without
the sky falling down. Here, however, the message from
Doonesbury becomes important."6 Legal academics, and perhaps
many lawyers, might secretly believe (indeed, profess to know)
that legal ethics is just so much rubbish, but silence about the
rule is maintained for the benefit of appearances. The public
would misread what we intended to do if we abandoned the
requirement. The average citizen might think that the profession did not care about the honesty and integrity of lawyers. Of
course, within the academy we could tell ourselves that the
25. Sanford Levinson, Gerrymandering and the Brooding Omnipresence of Proportional Representation: Why Won't It Go Away?, 33 UCLA L. REV. 257, 268 n.43

(1985) (asserting that the proposition that voting rights proceed from the Fourteenth
Amendment makes the Fifteenth Amendment superfluous).
26. See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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abandonment of the rule demonstrated no such thing. It merely
demonstrated (now, here comes the difficult part) that

" ...

"

We invite the reader to complete that sentence.
For example, we could tell ourselves that the repeal merely
demonstrated that ethics cannot be taught to students of such
advanced years whose personal ethics are fully developed. There
are, however, two problems with that answer. First, empirical
and anecdotal evidence suggests otherwise. 7 Second, even if it
were true that instruction, discussion, or analysis cannot improve personal ethics, the subject of legal ethics is not coextensive with the subject of personal ethics. The restrictions on a
lawyer engaging in a business transaction with a client,28 the
rules on safekeeping client property,29 and the nuances of conflicts of interest 0 are not matters that law students should be
27. The empirical evidence and theoretical justification are ably summarized in
Rhode, supra note 5, at 42-50. Rhode concludes that the subject is so central to
effective law practice that it should be required of all students, that there is substantial evidence of "some modest relationship between moral judgment and moral
behavior," and that "[clonduct can also be affected by making individuals aware of
ways that pressures for conformity, structures of authority, and diffusion of responsibility skew judgment." Id. at 47. She also notes that good teaching can avoid the
extremes of moral relativism, on the one hand, and patronizing indoctrination, on
the other. Id. at 48-50.
28. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.8(a) (1992); see also In
re Neville, 708 P.2d 1297 (Ariz. 1985) (censuring a lawyer for his failure to give full
information to a client who was an experienced real estate trader and who had been
represented by the lawyer in various real estate deals for over ten years); Sexton v.
Arkansas Supreme Court Comm., 774 S.W.2d 114 (Ark. 1989) (suspending the license of an attorney who borrowed money from his client without fully disclosing
the speculative nature of the transaction and the risks of nonpayment); In re
Smyzer, 527 A.2d 857 (N.J. 1987) (disbarring a lawyer for convincing a client to invest proceeds from the sale of her home in a holding company without disclosing his
interest in the company).
29. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.15; see also In re

Velasquez, 507 A.2d 145 (D.C. App. 1986) (granting reciprocal disbarment of a lawyer who deposited personal and business funds into trust account to conceal funds
from creditors); Attorney Grievance Comm'n v. Dacy, 542 A.2d 841 (Md. 1988) (suspending lawyer for making temporary transfers between bank, lawyer's personal
account, and escrow account during representation of financial institution in real
estate settlement matters).
30. Our coursebook devotes two lengthy chapters consisting of 235 pages of text,
14 principal cases, and numerous notes to this important and complex subject. HAZAR ET AL., supra note 8, at 619-854. A lawyer's duty to avoid conflicting interests
can be introduced in a three-credit ethics course, but full treatment would require a
separate course.
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expected to intuit based on their otherwise fully developed moral
character, however good that moral character might be. Further,
it is not sensible to suggest that we should not teach the design
and performance of institutions of justice, the role of lawyers in
those institutions, and the availability or nonavailability of lawyers to large sectors of the populace, based on some claim that
character cannot be molded. Note that the ABA Standard requires instruction on the "history, goals ...and responsibilities
of the legal profession" as well as its ethics codes."1 Repealing
the rule concerning ethics teaching simply cannot be justified by
the claim that there is nothing there to teach.
Alternatively, perhaps repeal could be explained by the sorry
track record law schools seem to have at addressing these issues. However much the subject may have developed since
Pipkin's study, 2 our many conversations with faculty at law
schools across the country convince us to report unhappily that
student response to many legal ethics courses mirrors the results of Pipkin's 1976 study: Students perceive ethics courses as
easier, less well taught, and a less valuable use of class time
than most other instruction.33 Is that not enough of a reason to
repeal the requirement?
It may surprise our readers to learn that we are tempted occasionally to answer that last question in the affirmative. In general, we oppose external bodies mandating curricular requirements
for schools of higher education. Overcoming that presumption
requires a strong justification. The results of more than twenty
years of required ethics instruction are mixed. Because so many
law schools have not taken the requirement seriously, merely
giving it lip service, and because the ABA has acquiesced.in this
neglect by not enforcing its rule, the ethics instruction has frequently been trivialized.3 4 The related requirement that stu-

31. ABA STANDARDS FOR THE APPROVAL OF LAW SCHOOLS Standard 302(a)(iv) (1995).
32. Pipkin, supra note 6.
33. See, e.g., Rhode, supra note 5, at 40-41.
34. Although the ABA has no formal non-enforcement policy, such an informal
policy can be inferred. The ABA countenances schools with no separate ethics course,
see supra notes 13-18 and accompanying text, and exclusive reliance on the pervasive approach is ineffective or insufficient. See Carrie J. Menkel-Meadow & Richard
A. Sander, The Infusion Method at UCLA: Teaching Ethics Pervasively, LAW &
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dents pass a multiple-choice examination that tests knowledge of
the ABA ethics codes also leads many students to view the
course solely as a bar preparation opportunity.3 5
Making students sit through courses they do not want to take
troubles us in and of itself. Even more troubling to us is that the
exercise may undermine rather than advance ethical sensitivity
and behavior, i.e., promote a form of "anti-ethics." Exposing a
captive audience of students to pedestrian and unchallenging instruction in ethics may produce negative results: numbness to
ethical difficulties of practice, and, far worse, a cavalier attitude
toward the responsibilities lawyers have to clients and the public. Given our belief that democracy depends to some degree
upon lawyers fulfilling their designated roles with integrity and
diligence, we believe it is shameful that law schools should tolerate the teaching of anti-ethics. What tempts us to suggest abandoning the rule on teaching legal ethics is that many law schools
and the ABA tolerate indifferent teaching of the subject, maintaining the course requirements largely as a means of reassuring the public that the profession cares about ethics.3"
Suggesting that a requirement be abandoned because some or
many law schools teach this important subject abominably rests
on an implicit premise: Either the subject is unteachable or the
law schools and the profession just do not really care about this
area of study we call legal ethics and, consequently, will never
bother to teach it correctly. Because we know that the subject is
as teachable as nearly everything else dealt with in the law
school curriculum,3 7 we believe that the public rightly would
perceive that abandoning the ethics requirement was a statement that those who train lawyers-a significant portion of the
profession-are uninterested in exposing law students to a serious consideration of the responsibilities of lawyers, either as
those responsibilities currently exist or as they should or could
be.
What we have demonstrated thus far is that a rule by itself
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 129, 135 (stating that "we should not
rely on the infusion method to teach legal ethics").
35. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 40-41.
36. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
37. See supra text accompanying notes 27-30.
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tells us very little about the "law" or the normative understand-

ing of the community that professes to have such a rule. The
ethics requirement does not mean that law schools take the
subject seriously; promulgation of a rule does not by itself bring
about the consequences implicit in the rule's purpose. 8 One
must understand the stories attached to this rule-the stories
constituting the community's understanding of what the rule
means-to grasp the meaning of this bit of "law." Unfortunately,
many of these stories undermine the rule's import. They are
stories about the rule being a cheap public relations move on the
part of a profession suffering much public criticism.39 They are

stories about "gut" courses taught by adjunct-professors more
interested in telling war stories than engaging in legal or ethical
analysis.4" They are stories that proclaim that the rule itself is
a sham-a disgraceful state of affairs.41
Of course, there are counter-stories alive within the law school
community. Stories told by a lively band of teacher/scholars who
devote much of their academic careers to the subject of legal
ethics.42 These scholars, however, remain for the most part outside the mainstream. At many prestigious law schools, we have
heard faculty members explain (unconvincingly, in our view)
why their school has no such person on board: They cannot find
or hire any scholar of quality in this subject. The stories told by
committed ethics teachers, held in such low esteem by the
"haves" in our profession, are unlikely to dominate anytime in
the near future. Nonetheless, these counter-stories are impor-

38. See supra notes 16-18 and accompanying text.

39. See, e.g., Grant Uvifusa, Who Do We Trust?, READERS DIG., Jan. 1993, at 109
(citing a Harris poll that indicated that only 25% of Americans gave lawyers' moral
and ethical standards a positive rating).
40. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 40.
41. See, e.g., Pipkin, supra note 6; Trudeau, supra note 1.

42. See, e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 21-24 (describing a number of such
teachers); see also Walter H. Bennett, Jr., The UNC Intergenerational Legal Ethics
Project: Expanding the Contexts for Teaching Professional Ethics and Values, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 173, 174 & nn.3-4; Mary C. Daly et al.,
Contextualizing Professional Responsibility: A New Curriculum for a New Century,
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 193, 199 & n.27; David B.
Wilkins, Redefining the 'Professional'in Professional Ethics: An InterdisciplinaryAp-

proach to Teaching Professionalism, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995,
at 241, 247-51.
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tant, which is why we write on this subject.
The counter-stories, those that place ethics at the center of
legal education and celebrate the richness and complexity of the
subject, are important because they challenge accepted understanding. They help reveal the poverty and shame of prevailing
conceptions and thereby undermine accepted understandings.
Would we really be better off, more proud of our calling and the
schools of which we are a part, if no one in the academy took
seriously the idea that legal ethics was a subject of importance?
Few would answer that question in the affirmative. Academic
snobbery notwithstanding, most law professors want to believe
that they belong to a system that cares about the integrity and
behavior of the lawyers that it produces. We would like to think
that we are part of a process that at least aims to produce lawyers of whom we can be proud-lawyers who will not disgrace us
by disgracing themselves. The counter-stories told by the
ethicists help keep that hope alive.
The import of a rule (such as the requirement that law schools
teach ethics) or a story (such as one showing that ethics is a rich
subject, central to the study of law) rests upon the commitment
demonstrated to the rule or the story. Who risks what in the
name of the rule? Who takes what action in the name of the
story? The commitment of the legal academy to the rule requiring legal ethics is embarrassingly low.43 At many schools any
teacher will do, whether or not the teacher is a full-time academic, dedicated to the subject, or engaged in scholarship on
it.44 No law school would think of taking the same approach to
the staffing of civil procedure, contracts, constitutional law, or
any other subject that is viewed as part of the "core curriculum."
Anecdotal reports also indicate a casualness with respect to the
materials used or even whether reading is required at all. The
existence of so many one- or two-credit ethics offerings (and even
no-credit requirements), in a domain in which core subjects are
given three to six credits, also demonstrates the low estate of
the course. We might pass off the indifference to the materials
used to teach the subject as honoring the principle of academic

43. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
44. See supra notes 13-15 and accompanying text.
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freedom, but we cannot similarly dismiss the casualness regarding teacher selection and the low credit hours.
The excuse that full-time teachers dedicated to teaching and
scholarship in the field cannot be found will not do. The market
somehow produces highly qualified people to fill tenure-track
teaching positions for the courses that require them. We do not
hold unlimited faith in the invisible hand of the market, but we
recognize its operative power when law teaching positions are in
large demand, as is the case today.4" That same invisible hand,
we believe, has created the dearth of credible people in this
subject. Put simply, it is not a career-savvy move for a young
person entering the law teaching market to advertise herself as
dedicated primarily to ethics. It may be permissible to express
some willingness to teach legal ethics, but too much enthusiasm
is dangerous. One would not want to be mistaken for a simpleton by demonstrating deep interest in a subject held in such low
regard.
Coercion can increase commitment. It is often easier to conform than to fight. The ABA, if it cared to enforce its requirement, could insist that full-time faculty teach the course. Alumni
dissatisfied with their own shoddy ethics training could dedicate
chairs to the subject or otherwise exert influence to change current practice. Deans, who now have to puff and dissemble to
accreditation teams, might instead use their influence to set the
hiring of ethics teachers and the teaching of the subject as a
priority. Such efforts, however, would require care and commitment on the part of those actors.
Embarrassment can also provoke change, which in part explains why we write this and employ a provocative tone. The
lying about legal ethics should stop-a simple proposition and
one we take as unassailable. If the lying continues, a case for
repealing the ethic's teaching requirement can be made. Let the
public and press read that move as an expression of our disinterest toward the integrity of the lawyers we produce. The truth

45. Adam Smith referred to the market forces governed by the notions of supply
and demand as "an invisible hand." See ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE
AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 456 (R.H. Campbell et al. eds., 1976)
(1776).
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would then be out.
Why should law faculties, deans and the organized profession
commit to teaching legal ethics and teaching it well? The affirmative case for enforcing and caring about the rule requiring the
teaching of ethics warrants brief statement. First, the widespread assumption that law students will learn what they need
to know about the law of lawyering, the regulation of the legal
profession, and the moral aspects of being a lawyer by a process
of exposure to law school is clearly wrong. What law students
need to understand about the law and ethics of lawyering does
not occur naturally and pervasively throughout the curriculum
without much special planning, attention, and monitoring. As
Deborah Rhode put it, this laissez faire position toward incorporating ethical instruction with the rest of the curriculum is difficult to reconcile with the available evidence about what actually
happens.46 In the 1950s, for example, students at nationally
accredited law schools reported that only a minute fraction of
curricular offerings introduced ethical issues into discussion."
Rhode's recent survey of 138 casebooks in fourteen subject matter areas published by the three leading casebook publishers "reveal[ed] only a small minority of texts that [gave] substantial
attention to issues of professional responsibility."48 Rhode found
that the coverage varied somewhat by subject matter (e.g., civil
procedure texts addressed more ethics issues than contracts
texts), was often confined to a reprinting of some bar rules, and
that the median coverage of ethics issues per volume was 1.4%
of total pages.49
Second, the law of lawyering affects everything that a lawyer
does from the first day of practice to the last. Viewed in practical terms, this body of law is more important to lawyers than
any other subject matter in the law curriculum. Many law graduates never deal with much of the legal doctrine that they
learned as part of the required curriculum, for example, future

46. Rhode, supra note 5, at 35-36 (stating that there is reason to doubt how pervasive ethical instruction really is).
47. See KELLY, supra note 5, at 15 (stating that the extent of pervasive teaching
of ethics was minimal).
48. Rhode, supra note 5, at 41.
49. Id. at 41 n.52.
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interests, but every law graduate who practices law needs to
know the basic elements of the law of lawyeringY° An understanding of the system through which society grants access to
law and legal institutions and of the lawyer's role in that system
is as central to legal training as the society's concepts of contract
or property law.
In every field of practice, lawyers encounter fundamental
ethics issues-prohibited assistance, confidentiality and loyalty." Understanding this body of law is a prerequisite to the
moral reasoning and moral choice that flow from legal rules that
confer discretion upon the lawyer. Where the ethics rules require or prohibit certain conduct, a lawyer's decision to disobey
should come from conscientious deliberation and choice, not
blithe ignorance. Critical reflection upon and reform of legal
rules and institutions that'regulate lawyer behavior rest upon
knowledge of this law and of the regulatory structures that administer it.
Third, despite the doubts previously mentioned, solid evidence
shows that exposure to professional ethics instruction can serve
to heighten ethical sensitivity and may increase student capacity
for reflective moral judgment.52 Most law students lack formal
exposure to moral philosophy; they also tend to be uninformed
about the history and sociology of the legal profession and of
other professions here and abroad. 3 Exposure to a wide range
of illustrative problems in the context of moral traditions, the
law of lawyering, and other relevant knowledge advances the
ability to recognize ethical issues and the capacity to engage in
critical reflection concerning them. Questions of central importance are addressed on both the personal level of "What kind of
a lawyer do I want to be?" and the collective level of "What kind
of profession do I want to serve?" The personal dimension addresses choices such as area of practice and lawyer role, for
example, advocate or counselor, as well as choices of behavior
within a particular subject matter area or professional role. The

50.
51.
52.
53.

Id. at 43.
Id.
See supra note 27.
See Rhode, supra note 5, at 43.
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collective dimension addresses choices that the profession and
society must make concerning the content and extent of professional regulation, the structural arrangements controlling the
availability of lawyers, and similar matters.
Professional ethics consists of the ideals and norms of a historically situated group, understood and mediated through institutions and practices.5 4 Professional ethics differs from personal
ethics, although personal ethics are important. Legal ethics is
not moral philosophy, the sociology of professions, or economics,
although they can contribute to understanding professional
ethics.55 Professional ethics transcends and informs such essential elements of good practice as skills or craftsmanship. Legal
ethics is a field of independent moral complexity arising out of
the tradition and practice of lawyering in the American
republic." Applied economic analysis illuminates some aspects
of the subject, especially the regulatory structures affecting the
availability, cost, and quality of service.5" Supply and demand
in competitive markets, barriers to entry, the concept of
externalities, and the economist's theory of agency costs are
essential to understanding the market for legal services and
major dimensions of the lawyer-client relationship." Similarly,

54. See ALASDAIR C. MACINTYRE, AFTER VIRTUE: A STUDY IN MORAL THEORY
187-203, 220-25 (2d ed. 1984) (articulating an Aristotelian concept of virtue in which
complex forms of human cooperative activity---"practices"--develop standards of excellence in the internal goods of the particular practice, such as that of practicing law;
and in which institutions, such as the organized bar, can assist individuals in the
acquisition of habits and virtues required for excellence in that practice); THOMAS L.
SHAFFER, FAITH AND THE PROFESSIONS 296-97 (1987); see also ANTHONY T.
KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION (1993)
(addressing professional ethics in the particular context of the legal profession).
55. See Wilkins, supra note 42, at 242-43, 247-57 (defining legal ethics and relating it to other disciplines).
56. See KRONMAN, supra note 54.
57. See, e.g., HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 439-43 (presenting a game-theoretic analysis of abusive litigation tactics); id. at 532-34 (discussing the economic incentives of contingent fees); id. at 539-43 (addressing the effects of the American rule
on who pays the costs of litigation); id. at 934-36 (analyzing the supply and demand
for legal services); id. at 955-56 (explaining market imperfections in the delivery of
legal services); id. at 978-79 (considering the effects of lawyer advertising).
58. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 469-70, 588-90
(4th ed. 1992) (describing how markets for legal services operate, and the social
effects of various models of the legal marketplace).
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feminist and critical theories offer useful perspectives on many
aspects of the subject.5 9 But the heart of legal ethics-the extent to which obligations to the courts, third persons, and the
legal system should constrain lawyers' behavior on a client's behalf is a normative domain flowing from American political traditions and legal practice involving the pursuit of public good
through institutional arrangements."
Stephen Bundy has summarized some of the reasons why
requiring exposure to legal ethics is essential to a sound law
curriculum:
[A] lawyer cannot accurately grasp the contours, significance,
or potential for reform of U.S. law without understanding the
core material of legal ethics. That material includes, at a
minimum, the role of lawyers in making, shaping compliance
with, and enforcing the law, this country's increasingly controversial attachment to the adversary system, and the circumstances under which actors have access to legal counsel
or advocacy. A legal ethics course is also the natural setting
to discuss the policy preferences that underlie our nation's
perennial (and presently heated) national debates about regulation, litigation, and the role of lawyers. Those include our
continuing national preferences for weak, poorly funded, and
highly politicized governmental and judicial authorities, for
litigated, rather than consensual, solutions to problems of
governance, and for political and legal processes dominated
by private parties and their lawyers. Finally, the legal ethics
course offers students a chance to consider potentially impor-

59. Carol Gilligan's emphasis on maintaining and building relationships provides
an important example. See CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL
THEORY AND WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT 24-63 (1982); Stephen Ellmann, The Ethic of
Care As an Ethic for Lawyers, 81 GEO. L.J. 2665 (1993) (applying Gilligan's ethics of
care to the practice of law); see also Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Portia in a Different
Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process, 1 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 39
(1985) (discussing feminist scholarship and the legal profession); Deborah L. Rhode,
Gender and Professional Roles, 63 FORDHAM L. REV. 39 (1994) (discussing women's
professional roles and relationships).
60. In a series of historical articles on American legal education, Paul D.
Carrington has shown that pursuing the public good was a central aim of legal education from the earliest days and at least through the 1950s. See, e.g., Paul D.
Carrington, Hail! Langdell!, 20 LAW & Soc. INQUIRY 691, 695-701 (1995) (noting
that perhaps the most vital function of university legal education was to prepare
graduates for public responsibilities).
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tant modes of legal regulation-such as selection on the basis
of personal character, professional socialization, reputation,
and professional discipline-that they will not encounter
elsewhere in the curriculum. 6'
One reason why deans and faculties should care about recruiting teachers committed to this field is that effective teaching of
legal ethics requires continuing growth in the quality and quantity of legal scholarship bearing on the subject.62 Conventional
wisdom understands that academic respect for a subject depends
on faculty recognition that good scholarship has been done in
the field, that interesting questions exist, and that the subject
offers opportunities for creative scholarship. Moreover, the capacity of course materials and instructors to engage students in
critical reflection on lawyer roles and practice rests inevitably on
empirical and theoretical scholarship that describes or predicts
behavior accurately and suggests or advances alternative possibilities.
But something more can be said about the importance of encouraging scholarship concerning lawyers and law practice."
Quality scholarship in legal ethics has the potential to exert a
positive influence on legal scholarship as a whole because, at its
best, scholarship in legal ethics offers two attributes sorely lacking in contemporary legal scholarship: attention to context and a
focus on obligation.
The subject of "practical ethics," above all, is contextual.6
This rings true whether the focus is on professional ethics or on
the normative considerations in personal choice. By contextual,
we mean that practical ethics addresses specific persons situated

61. Stephen M. Bundy, Ethics Education in the First Year: An Experiment, LAW
& CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 19, 32-33 (footnotes omitted).
62. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 53.
63. The material in this and the next two paragraphs is drawn from Susan P.
Koniak & Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Paying Attention to the Signs, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 117, 126-27 (footnotes added).
64. See generally Susan P. Koniak, When Courts Refuse To Frame the Law and
Others Frame It to Their Will, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1075 (1993) (discussing confficting
commitments of the courts and of the organized bar concerning lawyer conduct in
the context of the Kaye, Scholer case); David B. Wilkins, Making Context Count:
Regulating Lawyers After Kaye, Scholer, 66 S. CAL. L. REV. 1145 (1993) (discussing
the importance of context in lawyer regulation).
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in specific settings having to make decisions in real time, which
is always in short supply, resulting in imperfect information,
with real and often irreversible consequences. Law as a larger
human institution is similarly contextual-that is, specific in
historical time and in place of application-for essentially similar reasons.
Despite these characteristics of law, and therefore also of the
practice of law, including the judicial function, the ethos of legal
scholarship over the last two decades has celebrated the abstract, expressing contempt for the contextual characteristics
that make law, Law. The quest has been for an escape from the
specific into the general, the universal, and the eternal. The
theory underlying law and economics, for example, is of this
generalist character, as is the "equality" theorizing of scholars
who differ in their political commitments from their law-andeconomics counterparts.' Writing about law-a contextual enterprise-at the levels of abstraction so cherished by much of
legal academia, in our opinion, sheds precious little light on the
subject ostensibly under consideration. In contrast, the illuminating work in law and economics and other "law and -" disciplines is based upon factual foundations such as social science
case studies, whether the work is empirical, historical or descriptive. Too often that work is marginalized. Legal ethics is
similarly fact-based, and similarly marginalized. A broader recognition of the possibilities of scholarly endeavor in the legal
ethics field would attract a new cadre of scholar-teachers to the

65. Despite their different vantage points, two recent books similarly criticize
contemporary legal scholarship. See KRONIMAN, supra note 54, at 225-70 (noting that
recent legal scholarship has been "dominated by two movements inspired by an ideal
of legal science that is antagonistic to the common-law tradition and to the claims of
practical wisdom which that tradition has always honored"); id. at 267; see also
MARY ANN GLENDON, A NATION UNDER LAWYERS: How THE CRISIS IN THE LEGAL
PROFESSION Is TRANSFORMING AMERICAN SOCIETY 199-229 (1994) (observing that
many contemporary legal scholars have had little law practice and tend to disdain
it; much fashionable legal scholarship is either advocacy, highly abstract or addressed to nonlawyer audiences).
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field,66 stimulate faculty interest in teaching the subject,67 and
give rise to a law school culture that would be more hospitable
and welcoming to the subject.' Informed by such scholarship,
law practices and legal institutions might serve public purposes
more adequately and foster accurate outcomes in fair and efficient proceedings.
II. WHAT SHOULD BE TAUGHT AND WHEN

A. The Place of Legal Ethics in Legal Education
What should be taught? When and how? What place would
the subject of legal ethics have in an ideal law curriculum? The
major possibilities, singly or in combination, are: (1) a required
first-year course,6" (2) a required upperclass course, 70 (3) pervasive teaching of the subject throughout the curriculum, 71 and
(4) treatment of the subject in clinical settings,72 as well as a
variety of elective upperclass offerings.73 Much has and can be
66. Regarding the efficacy of incentives in producing a desired outcome, see generally SMITH, supra note 45, at 456 ("By pursuing his own interest [the individual]
frequently promotes that of the society more effectually than when he really intends
to promote it.").
67. Id.
68. Id.
69. Bundy, supra note 61, at 24-27 (discussing the failed Berkeley experiment
with a required first-year course).
70. See, e.g., KELLY, supra note 5, at 49 (indicating that most law schools require an upper-class ethics course); infra note 84.
71. The best and most comprehensive treatment of the pervasive approach is
Rhode, supra note 5. See also Koniak & Hazard, supra note 63 (discussing the pervasive approach generally); Menkel-Meadow & Sander, supra note 34 (discussing the
UCLA experiment with a pervasive approach); Rhode, supra note 15 (describing
Stanford's experience with pervasive instruction).
72. See David Luban & Michael Millemann, Good Judgment: Ethics Teaching in
Dark Times, 9 GEo. J. LEGAL ETHICS 31, 40, 58-87 (1995) (arguing that good, practical judgment is best taught in clinical teaching of lawyering and legal ethics). For
additional sources arguing that legal ethics is best taught in clinical settings, see id.
at 40 n.37; see also Robert P. Burns, Teaching the Basic Ethics Class Through
Simulation: The Northwestern Program in Advocacy and Professionalism, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 37 (discussing Northwestern's program
integrating legal ethics with trial advocacy).
73. See Bennett, supra note 42 (discussing a unique course involving law students working with the oral histories of practitioner mentors); Heidi L. Feldman, Enriching the Legal Ethics Curriculum: From Requirement to Desire, LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 51 (discussing Michigan's first-year "bridge week"
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said about each of these alternatives. A symposium issue of Law
and ContemporaryProblems, arising out of a national conference
held by and for recipients of ethics grants from the W.M. Keck
Foundation, canvasses the advantages and disadvantages of
each.74 We will not repeat that discussion here. Instead, we
proceed directly to our conclusions.
What would be the elements of an ideal law curriculum that
took issues related to the law and ethics of lawyering, broadly
viewed, as seriously as law schools now take core subjects such
as civil procedure or contracts?
First, although requiring an ethics course in the first year
seems like an inherently attractive proposition, the competition
for hours in that formative year poses a severe obstacle to the
introduction of any new course.7' Moreover, first-year students'
lack of knowledge about what lawyers do and the 'settings in
which they work interferes with an understanding of the problems arising out of the professional role.76 Further, a sophisticated discussion of some ethics issues requires substantive
knowledge of legal concepts not ordinarily taught in the first

and various advanced seminars dealing with legal ethics); Thomas B. Metzloff, Seeing the Trees Within the Forest: Contextualized Ethics Courses As a Strategy for
Teaching Legal Ethics, LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995, at 227 (discussing Duke's effort to teach legal ethics in a variety of advanced courses and seminars, some dealing with practice contexts, such as civil litigation, and others more
humanistic in nature).
74. LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., Summer/Autumn 1995.
75. Stephen Bundy's description of the Berkeley experience supports both points:
The course received only two credit-hours and could not survive under these conditions. Bundy, supra note 61, at 27-28. Yet the case for first-year exposure is a
strong one:
By focusing exclusively on learning the "law" and the tropes of argument
and interpretation that lawyers use to serve their clients, the standard
first-year curriculum falsely implies that the only important ethical issues
are those of competent performance within a well-functioning attorneyclient relationship and a well-functioning adversary system. This renders
invisible virtually all the difficult and important issues of professional
obligation and system design, and gives students a highly distorted-and
potentially dangerous-picture of their future professional role.
Id. at 32. The three-year effort by a group of law professors at Berkeley to teach an
adequate ethics course in two semester-hours led to "an unshakable conviction that
the course could not be taught properly in less than three units [45 hours of instruction]." Id. at 19.
76. See id. at 28-29, 33.
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year. For example, first-year students likely would not fully
understand the conflict of interest problem posed by a lawyer for
a corporation in representing both the manager charged with
wrongdoing in a shareholder's derivative action and the corporation itself." The contextual character of professional ethics
means that students' lack of exposure to relevant advanced
courses poses a real problem. Important and conceptually demanding issues such as aiding and abetting client fraud, the
duties owed to constituents in representation of a corporation or
other legal entity, and the responsibilities of lawyers who facilitate transactions by means of legal opinions are difficult to teach
to beginning law students."8 Nevertheless, we believe that introducing some ethics issues in the first year is highly desirable.
Because the first year curriculum generally emphasizes litigation roles, an introduction to adversary limits and to other lawyer roles should come early.
Second, if the first-year curriculum does not include a required course surveying the subject, prior to graduation students
should take an ethics course of at least three semester-hour
units. Allocating only one or two credit-hours makes it difficult
or impossible to do the subject matter justice.7 9 In addition, because most major law school courses, and virtually all required
courses, provide at least three semester-hours of credit, students
perceive a two-credit course as less important and, therefore,
such a course receives less attention than other courses that
receive three or four hours of credit.8"
Third, the ethics course should explore and replicate, in practice contexts, basic concepts of the subject. Those concepts include: confidentiality; avoiding conflicting interests; and distinguishing the lawyer's roles as a counselor, planning and documenting transactions in the privacy of the law office, and as an
advocate, playing a partisan and combative role in contentious

77. See id. at 33-34 (discussing the need to continue ethics instruction in the
context of second- and third-year course topics).

78. See id.
79. See supra text accompanying notes 13-15.
80. See Pipkin, supra note 6, at 252 (arguing that courses with fewer units of
credit are often perceived by students as not rating well on the "latent hierarchy" of
law school courses).
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public proceedings. Examining these matters by concentrating
on the factual settings in which they arise gives students a
chance to revisit and better imagine the implicit but specific
backdrop of many widely elected courses, whether it be corporate practice, criminal prosecution or defense, matrimonial dissolution, or estate planning.8 ' In short, the law and ethics of lawyering should integrate and revisit different parts of the curriculum the way'upperclass courses such as administrative law,
evidence, advanced civil procedure, federal courts, conflict of
laws, trial practice, commercial law, collective bargaining, and
insurance currently revisit first-year civil procedure or contracts
courses in richer detail.
The case for continuing pervasive ethics instruction beyond
the required course, is a powerful one. Ethics issues arise in a
particular context, one that directly influences ethical decisionmaking.82 Instructors, because they can and should know the
context well, can highlight the interaction of legal rules, institutional arrangements and ethical obligations within a particular
setting."
Pervasive instruction also locates ethics in the heartland of
legal education-the major first-year and other required or elective courses that form the curriculum's core." The curriculum
implicitly teaches legal ethics, how lawyers do and should behave in representing clients.
The pervasive method exists as an actuality at all
schools.... Whenever a professor asks a student what the

81. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 50.
82. See id. at 50-51.
83. See id.
84. See E. Gordon Gee & Donald W. Jackson, Bridging the Gap: Legal Education
and Lawyer Competency, 1977 B.Y.U. L. REV. 695, 881-92 (presenting survey results
that identify a common core curriculum and casebook-oriented teaching at American
law schools; innovations, such as clinical skills-teaching, are discouraged because
they are more costly, more difficult to administer, conflict with institutional attitudes
and habits, impose greater demands on teachers, and may be perceived by students
as less directly related to job placement). For more recent data concerning required
and elective courses at American law schools, see WILLIAm B. PowERS, A STMY OF
CONTEMPORARY LAW SCHOOL CURRICULA (1987). Table-3 of the Powers survey indicates that the percentage of law schools requiring a legal ethics course rose from
53.5% in 1974-1975 to 80.5% in 1984-1986. Id. at 12-13.

168

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:145

lawyer in a case should have done differently, what strategy
might have worked better than the one employed, what advice a lawyer should give a client in light of certain legal
principles, students are being asked what a lawyer might do
and what a lawyer should do.'
Law students garner their basic understanding of what a lawyer
does and should do from this constant and pervasive exposure.8" But, too often, lack of awareness, inconsistency, sloppiness, and even ignorance, surround the teaching of the ethics
component.87 A conscious and systematic effort to encourage all
teachers to deal directly and intelligently with ethics issues
relating to their subjects is badly needed. The pervasive approach, however, will not succeed unless the faculty as a whole
commits to it and institutional monitoring ensures that individual faculty members take their responsibility seriously."
Relying exclusively on the pervasive method, however, almost
certainly will not suffice. "[B]y giving the pieces of legal ethics a
home everywhere, it effectively deprives its core concepts of a
home anywhere."89 It is always in danger of failing to "confront,
in any probing or systematic way, the central ethical concepts,
institutional and political understandings, and regulatory alternatives that underlie all areas of professional ethics and regulation."" Administrators, professors, and students are all too
likely to view pervasive ethics, by itself, as an ungraded "addon"-a temporary detour from the serious work of each course.
Fourth, an array of elective courses should offer more specific
treatment of individual practice contexts to smaller groups of
students, for example, the special ethics problems of corporate
practice. 9' Interdisciplinary seminars should exist that relate
85. Koniak & Hazard, supra note 63, at 118.
86. Id. at 118-19.
87. Id. at 119-20.
88. See Rhode, supra note 5, at 51-53; Rhode, supra note 15, at 145-48 (describing
elements of mandate and choice in Stanford's program of pervasive instruction).
89. See Bundy, supra note 61, at 33.
90. Id.
91. See Daly et al., supra note 42, at 199-211 (describing Fordham Law School's
effort to teach legal ethics in a practice context, focusing on topics such as corporate
representation, criminal prosecution and defense, etc.).
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lawyers and the legal profession to some related body of information or ideas (e.g., history or sociology of the legal profession,
lawyering and moral philosophy, economic analysis of legal institutions).92 Clinical and trial advocacy courses provide a special
opportunity for examining ethics in real time with real pressures. 93 Every school should take advantage of these powerful
learning opportunities.
Finally, tenured and tenure-track members of the faculty who
have a serious scholarly interest in the law and ethics of lawyering should teach most of the ethics curriculum, especially the
required elements.
The painful reality is that not a single law school in the United States combines the elements mentioned above in its current
curriculum. Professional ethics may get prominent attention in
law alumni publications but merits only a whisper and a promise when it comes to faculty selection, inclusion in the core curriculum, and the research interests of law faculty.94 Remedying
this neglect should be a central goal of law deans and faculties.
B. Rule, Story, and Commitment in Teaching "The Law and
Ethics of Lawyering"
We have previously expressed our ideas concerning the basic
required course in "the law and ethics of lawyering" in the book
of that title we published with Geoffrey Hazard.95 The course
embodied in that book represents our best effort to reform attitudes about the subject and to improve its teaching. We believe
the basic course we designed is analytically sound, is pedagogically challenging, and engenders student attention and respect.
Here we discuss our goals for the course, the themes we emphasize, and some continuing problems about which we have tentative thoughts. We have organized these reflections under three
subheadings: Rule, Story, and Commitment. We believe that all

92. See generally sources cited supra note 73.
93. See generally sources cited supra note 72 (arguing that students best assimilate ethical standards when they must confront ethical dilemmas during simulated

law practice).
94. See supra notes 10-15 and accompanying text.
95. HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8.
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three elements are essential to a good legal ethics course.
1. Rules and Their Limitations
"Rule" refers to normative statements in the form of legal
rules. Although any legal ethics course must discuss legal rules,
exclusive reliance upon this method can concentrate too narrowly on the codes of lawyer ethics adopted by the ABA and tested
by the Multistate Professional Responsibility Examination
(MPRE). The law of lawyering, however, is the proper subject
matter and that law includes important aspects of agency law,
civil procedure, criminal law, evidence and other subjects.9 6 The
law of lawyering further encompasses some aspects of substantive law relating to important fields of legal practice, for example, SEC rules governing issuance of securities or IRS rules
governing tax preparation.
Our insistence on emphasizing the "law of lawyering" serves
several purposes. First, law students value courses that teach
relevant legal doctrine in a rigorous yet rewarding fashion. Our
emphasis on law increases the respect of students for the subject.
Second, understanding the options for actors embedded in the
underlying law and the options condemned by law is an important and practical first step for the exercise of moral judgment as
a lawyer. Overall, we have found that issues of personal identity
(What kind of a lawyer do I want to be?), moral decision-making
(What are the sources of guidance and what norms should control
behavior?), and professional role (How should a lawyer relate to
clients, colleagues, courts and third parties?) emerge out of a
robust consideration of the law of lawyering. In our experience,
law students, especially in large classes, hesitate to begin with
ethical discourse, but they are willing to reach ethical issues and
reflect upon them when the issues grow out of an informed consideration of the options available in a story- or case-oriented

96. See, e.g., Upjohn Co. v. United States, 449 U.S. 383 (1981) (discussing an
organization's attorney-client privilege when the organization's lawyer obtains information from lower-level employees to give legal advice to corporate managers);
Cuyler v. Sullivan, 446 U.S. 333 (1979) (discussing potential conflicts of interest
when an attorney represents co-defendants); Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495 (1947)
(holding that attorney work product is generally protected from discovery).
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analysis. Traditional legal materials promote discussion of critical issues: social structure-the sociology of the legal profession
and of the lawyer-client relationship; regulatory authority-who
should govern the profession and by what means; legal theory-whether the adversary system is morally justified; and regulation of the legal services market-who gets highly competent
legal services and who does not. Well-chosen cases placed in a
rich practice context, supplemented by the profession's ethics
rules and ethics opinions, the "other law" of the state, and summaries and excerpts from relevant literature provide a rich base
upon which to explore these important issues.
Although rules are an essential element of the law and ethics
of lawyering, they are inadequate as a primary focus for several
reasons. First, the term "rules," in the context of legal ethics
tends to refer to the ethics codes promulgated by the ABA and
adopted in one form or another by the high courts of the states.
The MPRE, required for admission to the bar in forty-seven
jurisdictions, 97 uses multiple-choice questions to test student
knowledge of the disciplinary rules set forth in the two modern
ABA ethics codes 9 -- a law that excludes most of the law of lawyering and that is not in effect anywhere." Because most law
students must take this test, many of them approach their required ethics course with tunnel vision-viewing it as preparation for the MPRE. These students badly need a broader view of
the subject.
The serious study of legal ethics requires consideration of
what actually happens in the kinds of situations in which lawyers find themselves. Unless we consider the other law that

97. ABA SECTION OF LEGAL EDUCATION AND ADMISSIONS TO THE BAR & THE
NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF BAR ExAmNRS, COMPREHENSIVE GUIDE TO BAR ADMISSION REQUIREMENTS 24-25 (1996).
98. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT (1995); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY (1982). By focusing on the Model Rules and Model Code,

the MPRE neglects the case law that interprets the rules and that fills gaps in
areas where the rules are silent.
99. The committee responsible for preparing the MPRE has recommended that
the National Conference of Bar Examiners expand the scope of the MPRE to include
parts of the law of lawyering not dealt with in the ABA's two ethics codes, but the
Conference has not yet responded. Interview with John S. Dzienkowski, member of
the MPRE Committee (Jan. 1996).
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governs these situations, for example, the criminal prohibition of
conduct constituting an obstruction of justice, this is impossible.
Obstruction of justice, it will be noted, was the charge brought
against the lawyers involved in Watergate, not some violation of
the disciplinary rules.0 0 Subsequent professional disciplinary
actions taken against Watergate's lawyers under the ethics rules
flowed from criminal convictions obtained under generally applicable statutes, not from special law directed only to lawyers. It
is a fact of life that professional discipline is not the principal
sanction that influences or controls lawyer behavior. Threats of
judicial contempt sanctions, malpractice liability, civil liability to
third persons, administrative and regulatory controls in agency
proceedings, and possible criminal charges affect behavior much
more potently.'0 '
The "other" law that is relevant depends upon the substantive
and procedural context of a given situation. For example, important issues of loyalty and confidentiality in a lawyer's representation of a corporation present themselves when the current
managers are charged with wrongdoing in a shareholder's derivative suit; corporate law, procedural law and perhaps other law
are as important as ethics rules when one considers what to do
in these settings. Realistic detail must guide the discussion of
what a lawyer should do. Without it, the ethics lessons are useless. Teaching legal ethics thus requires teaching a rich body of
particulars about lawyers' work.
The common view that legal ethics begins and ends with the
profession's ethics codes is a fundamental mistake. The ethics
codes do not speak on many subjects, leaving other law to govern many important matters.0 2 On many critical matters, such

100. Most of the Watergate lawyers were charged with violating 18 U.S.C. § 1503,
the federal obstruction of justice statute. See, e.g., United States v. Haldeman, 559
F.2d 31, 51 & nn.2-3 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
101. See David B. Wilkins, Who Should Regulate Lawyers?, 105 HARV. L. REV.
799 (1992) (discussing the various disciplinary, liability, institutional, and legislative
controls on lawyer behavior).
102. The ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct, for example, are silent on the
lawyer's authority to use threats of criminal charges in negotiations with a third
person. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 4.4 cmt. threatening to
prosecute or to report (1995) (noting omission from Model Rules). The ABA Model
Code of Professional Responsibility also contained no explicit provisions governing
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as providing illegal assistance or dealing with a tribunal, the
codes merely refer the matter to other law."3 Some rule provisions confer a discretion on lawyers that may or may not coincide with background law; a lawyer, with or without client consultation and concurrence, must nevertheless decide on a course
of action.' In all of these situations, the other law applicable
to lawyers is a critical source of guidance. The fact that the ethics codes provide little guidance on many matters requires that
the "other law" of lawyering receive systematic attention. An
important theme of a good legal ethics course is that lawyers
must look to a broad range of legal and moral sources when they
make professional decisions.
Lawyers will find themselves in serious trouble if, when faced
with a difficult ethical problem, they assume that all they need
to know is the text of the ethics rules.' 5 The breadth of cover-

conflicts of interest between a current and former client. Cf MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.9 cmt. Model Code Comparison (1995) (noting absence of
counterpart provision under Model Code). The California Rules of Professional Conduct say nothing about one of the lawyer's most important duties, that of confidentiality, leaving the topic to an inadequate and sweeping statutory provision. See CAL.
Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068 (West Supp. 1995); Roger C. Cramton, Proposed Legislation Concerning a Lawyer's Duty of Confidentiality, 22 PEPP. L. REV. 1467 (1995)
(asserting the need for legislation to address lawyer-client confidentiality).
103. The limits on a lawyer's partisan and zealous representation of a client were
historically expressed in terms of acting "within and not without the bounds of the
law." CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETHICS Canon 15 (1969). These limits are now
phrased in terms of not assisting "conduct that the lawyer knows is criminal or
fraudulent." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.2(d) (1995) (emphasis
added) (referring the lawyer to the general law of crime and fraud). Important. exceptions to the professional duty of confidentiality also turn on these terms. See
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 1.6(b) (1995) (allowing lawyers to reveal confidential information if necessary to prevent the client from committing specified criminal acts). The responsibilities of an advocate to opposing parties and counsel, embodied in Model Rule 3.4, are largely a restatement of or cross-reference to
criminal and procedural law. MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.4
(1995). Ex parte communications and attempts to influence judges or juries are governed explicitly by a cross-reference to means "permitted" or "prohibited by law."
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.5 (1995).
104. For discussions of the discretion conferred on lawyers by current ethics
codes, see ANDREW L. KAUFMIAN, PROBLEMS IN PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY 765-84
(3d ed. 1989); Ted Schneyer, Moral Philosophy's Standard Misconception of Legal
Ethics, 1984 WIS. L. REV. 1529; Ted Schneyer, Some Sympathy for the Hired Gun,
41 J. LEGAL EDUC. 11 (1991).
105. The simplistic view that confines legal ethics to the ethics codes often leads
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age of a good ethics course refreshes student knowledge about
subjects left unstudied for some time, or not studied at all, and
forces the student to integrate earlier learning with the new
material governing the conduct of lawyers.
The interrelationship between the profession's codes and the
state's other law has a deeper dimension. In a few highly important situations, such as client fraud and issues arising in
entity representation, other law-especially agency, criminal,
evidence, procedural, and tort law-governs the conduct of lawyers and sometimes dictates a response different from that
suggested on the face of the ethics rules." 6 Because other law
generally trumps the ethics rules, a lawyer who relies narrowly
on ethics rules and professional ideology takes grave risks.'07
One of the major themes underlying a good legal ethics course
is the tension between the profession's vision of lawyering,
embodied largely in professional codes, ethics opinions and
professional ideology, and other, usually more authoritative,
sources of law.'0 °
lawyers to believe that they can resolve ethical issues without engaging in legal research. Practicing lawyers who would never dream of giving an opinion to a client
without reading cases interpreting a statute make decisions regarding their professional duties without consulting a single case or an outside expert. Many of the major cases involving the civil liability of lawyers or their disbarment involve lawyers
who have gotten themselves in serious problems because they failed to research the
law governing lawyers or to obtain specialized legal advice from other knowledgeable
lawyers. Here, as elsewhere, it is often true that "a lawyer who represents herself
has a fool for a client." If the lawyer is to represent herself, she should at least
canvass all the law that is applicable before deciding on a course of action.
106. The ABA Standing Committee of Ethics and Professional Responsibility,
which issues advisory opinions concerning the meaning of the ABA Model Rules of
Professional Conduct, has concluded that Model Rule 1.6(b) in its present form is
unworkable, in the absence of a provision allowing disclosure of confidential information to the extent necessary 'to rectify the consequences of a client's criminal or
fraudulent act in the commission of which the lawyer's services had been used." ABA
Rejects Ancillary Business, Inroads on Client Confidence, 7 LAwS. MAN. ON PROF.
CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 256, 258 (Aug. 28, 1991). The committee's report was rejected
by the ABA House of Delegates in 1991. Id. The committee emphasized that a literal
application of Model Rule 1.6 "dictate[s] results which we believe to be unjust and
inconsistent and which threaten to unfairly subject lawyers to potential civil liability
and criminal prosecution." ProposalsMay Change Rules on Ancillaries, Confidentiality,
7 LAWS. MAN. ON PROF. CONDUCT (ABA/BNA) 172, 173 (June 19, 1991).
107. See Susan P. Koniak, The Law Between the Bar and the State, 70 N.C. L.
REV. 1389, 1412-13 (1992).
108. 'See generally id. (noting that "even when the ethics rules purport to speak
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The characteristics of the professional rules, which lawyers
drafted to govern themselves, also tell us something about selfregulation." 9 When lawyers draft rules that apply to their own
work, they naturally prefer rules that require neither interpretation nor any element of discretion in their enforcement. Although most lawyers recognize that this conception of law is
childish and simplistic when held by their clients, they yearn for
that simplicity when the law applies to themselves. Lawyers are
simplistic about this set of legal rules precisely because this law
affects them. This attitude explains why.the rules produced by
the profession either tend to tell lawyers exactly what to do, for
example, "don't commingle funds," or impose little or no constraint on their behavior."0 "[L]awyers by and large have a very
negative impression of the administration of justice, gleaned
from their experience representing clients, and want as little of
it for themselves as can be.""'
A second reason why a single-minded focus on legal rules is

directly on a matter and are the only existing source of precept on the question,
they may be ignored with relative ease so long as the case is not a disciplinary proceeding"); Koniak, supra note 64 (discussing the tension between the profession's notions of lawyering and the state's requirements in the context of the actions of lawyers representing savings and loan associations).
109. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., ProfessionalEthics, Rules, and Conduct, in CLE AND
THE LAWYER'S RESPONSIBILITIES IN AN EVOLVING PROFESSION: THE REPORT ON THE
ARDEN HOUSE III CONFERENCE 477, 487-90 (ALI/ABA, 1988) [hereinafter ARDEN
HOUSE III CONFERENCE].
110. The rules governing the safekeeping of client property are detailed and specific. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDuCT Rule 1.15 (1995). The rule dealing with use of dilatory tactics, however, is a model of generality and vagueness: "A
lawyer shall make reasonable efforts to expedite litigation consistent with the interests
of the client." MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 3.2 (1995) (emphases
added). Bar discipline proceedings evidence the difference between these two types of
rules: The rules governing commingling of funds are strictly and frequently enforced,
while a lawyer's use of dilatory tactics is virtually never the subject of discipline. To
illustrate, an August 21, 1996 Westlaw search of all state cases after 1985 with "discipline" in the synopsis, using the search terms (comming! /5 funds) yielded 665 cases. Substituting the phrase "dilatory tactics" for the earlier search term yielded just
19 cases; of these 19 cases, most references to dilatory tactics concerned the lawyer's
conduct before the disciplinary tribunal. See, eg., In re Bell, 588 N.E.2d 1093,- 1095
(1992); In re Stein, 575 N.Y.S.2d 18, 19 (1991).
111. Hazard, supra note 109, at 489. See also Austin Sarat, Lawyers and Clients:
Putting Professional Service on the Agenda of Legal Education, 41 J. LEGAL EDUC.
43, 50-52 (1991) (describing an empirical study showing the negative view of the legal system conveyed to clients by matrimonial lawyers).

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:145

ineffective, even if interpreted in the broader sense of the total
law of lawyering, is its neglect of broader ethical concerns. A
rule-oriented approach implies that ethics need not be viewed
broadly, that is, as an aspect of morality. "Real" ethics is
trivialized or ignored. A legal ethics course should include discussion of how to be a good person while being a good lawyer.
One aspect of this dimension of lawyering is the proper extent to
which a lawyer can bring to bear her own moral values while
effectively representing clients.
The final reason why rules are inadequate as a primary focus
is practical as well as jurisprudential: Rules themselves omit the
stories that give them meaning and neglect the commitment of
individuals and groups that gives them life and power. Any
sophisticated understanding of "law" must include more than the
normative statements embodied in legal rules. Rules by themselves lack definition, depth, and applicability until and unless
they are read along with the stories and narratives that illustrate their content, reach, and purpose. Stories illuminate
society's commitment-or lack of commitment-to the enforcement of the literal text of rules. At the margins, narratives embodying one principle will inevitably compete with conflicting
narratives. The rules, and the narratives that give those rules
purpose and direction, must be understood by the persons whose
behavior they seek to shape, and by the private and public institutions and officials who are in a position to enforce them. As
Robert Cover powerfully argued, a robust conception of law involves narratives and commitment as well as rules."' Teaching
the law of lawyering through cases in which arguments concerning the meaning and application of legal rules muster competing
visions of lawyering helps students to not only learn about the
law that will govern them, but to gain insight into the richness
of law itself.'

112. Robert M. Cover, Foreword:Nomos and Narrative, 97 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1983).
113. See infra notes 116-23 and accompanying text.
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2. Stories
"Stories" provide the context and detail essential to understanding and applying legal rules." One cannot determine the
meaning of rules or the priority among rules that conflict until
stories put some flesh on the bare bones of those rules. Stories
that provide metaphors for lawyering, such as the lawyer as the
champion of individuals who face state or private oppression, are
part of the professional personae of all American lawyers. Stories of lawyer-heroes feature in the imagination of all lawyers
and figure prominently in the teaching method employed by
some.115 Cases of the more mundane sort, flowing from disciplinary boards, civil and criminal charges against lawyers, agency proceedings, and court-imposed sanctions give meaning to the
law of lawyering by providing specific situations and practice
contexts that interpret and give life to ethics rules. These cases
also contain echoes of metaphor stories lurking in the background. Stories transform the monolithic uniformity of the ethics
rules-pretending, in effect, that every lawyer in every context
has the same duties and responsibilities-into a much more
variegated and discriminating landscape.
The heartland of legal education involves the case method.
Students should learn legal ethics within that realm. Major
reliance on other techniques, other than by an exceptionally
gifted teacher, will likely reinforce students' perception of legal
ethics as a marginal, ghettoized subject. Just as students may
not respect instruction that is taught by people not on the regular faculty, they are less likely to take seriously instruction that
does not use rigorous and familiar teaching methods."1
114. Robert Cover taught us by example and in his writing that law is, itself, a
story, and Thomas Shaffer, James Boyd White, and others taught us that stories
have much to say about becoming and being a lawyer. The extensive literature on
the uses of narrative includes Kathryn Abrams, Hearing the Call of Stories, 79 CAL.
L. REV. 971 (1991); Symposium, Legal Storytelling, 87 MICH. L. REV. 2073 (1989);
Pedagogy of Narrative: A Symposium, 40 J. LEGAL EDUC. 1 (1990). For a review and
critique of the narrative approach, see Daniel A. Farber & Suzanna Sherry, Telling
Stories Out of School: An Essay on Legal Narratives, 45 STAN. L. REV. 807 (1993).
115. Thomas L. Shaffer has authored a teaching book organized around lawyer
stories, THOMAS L. SHAFFER, AMEICAN LEGAL ETHICS: TEXT, READINGS, AND DISCUSSION TOPICS (1985), and several books discussing lawyer narratives and heroes. See,
e.g., SHAFFER, supra note 23; SHAFFER, supra note 54.
116. Audiovisual materials have a place in the basic course because of the vivid-
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The traditional case method prepares law students for practice by developing their sense of practical judgment and honing
their analytical and argumentative skills. A concrete case situation presents facts that require confrontation; in cases actual
lawyers were representing actual clients in a realistic and generally typical practice setting. The case method forces students to
see things from the differing points of view of the antagonists,
which cultivates empathy and tolerance. Students also have the
opportunity to disengage from the partisan standpoints to reflect
on the situation in broader terms of judgment, action, and social
policy." 7 The case method teaches what Llewellyn referred to
as "situation sense" and conveys understanding of the dynamics
of legal decision-making."8 The case method also cultivates
perceptual habits and may be used to cultivate a public-spirited
approach to law and legal institutions-what Brandeis referred
to as "the opportunity in the law" to lead an admirable life."'
Case discussion need not focus solely on litigation, but can require students to consider how the underlying transaction or
event might have been structured to avoid litigation. While
studying cases, students may be asked to play lawyers' roles,
which involves considering alternatives (planning), making
choices (acting), and, finally, evaluating the consequences (reflecting and judging). Methods that develop other skills and
attributes, such as role-playing, small-group discussions, simulations of interviewing, negotiating, and counseling, can supplement the case method, even in large classes.

ness and immediacy of their presentation of personality, character, and emotion.
They should be viewed, however, as a supplement to written narratives, not as the
primary material. Unlike Continuing Legal Education programs on ethics topics, law
school courses can and do require advance preparation. Heavy reliance on audiovisual materials works against the deep dynamic of legal education, in which rigorous
case analysis earns the most intellectual respect.
117. The argument that the training and work of the lawyer develops practical
judgment was powerfully and briefly made by Justice Brandeis in a famous talk to
law students. Louis D. Brandeis, The Opportunity in the Law (1905), excerpt reprinted in HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8 at 1086-89. For a recent elaboration of this argument, see KRONMAN, supra note 54, at 53-162.
118. KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE BRAMBLE BUSH 16-66 (1930) (describing the function and purpose of first-year case method teaching); KARL N. LLEWELLYN, THE CASE
LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA (Paul Gewirtz ed., 1989).
119. Brandeis, supra note 117.
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The argument positing that case teaching lacks sufficient
caring, humanism, or abstraction forgets that we must prepare
students to practice law in an unredeemed and often unforgiving
world. The law office and the courtroom are not comfortable,
"safe" places. They are demanding arenas of stress and required
performance. Law school preparation for practice-especially a
required course focusing on that practice-should engage the
same expectations of diligent preparation, active participation,
and competent performance that the law office and the courtroom take for granted.
Stories in the form of cases act as more than a vehicle for
understanding rules, honing skills of legal analysis, and developing practical judgment; they are a good avenue for the general
exploration of the terrain of ethics. Two separate but interrelated ethical traditions of reflection on morals deserve considersystems. Ination: rule-based systems 2 ' and virtue-based'
dividual teachers will tend to feature prominently one or the
other. The dominant ethical tradition in modern times stems
from the efforts of Kant's successors to build a structure of
rights, duties and moral rules based upon underlying social
contract assumptions.'2 2 Although this approach fits all too
comfortably with the contemporary preoccupation with
"rights,'' we believe it posits an unrealistic degree of individual autonomy and choice.
In any event, rights-based theories constitute only one of the
two major ethical traditions of the western world. The second
and older tradition emphasizes persons, relationships, and community rather than individual acts of choice by autonomous
persons. This tradition, a combination of Aristotelian thought
and Judaeo-Christian religion is more virtue-based than rule-

120. See supra notes 102-08 and accompanying text.
121. See infra notes 159-63 and accompanying text.
122. For a brief overview see DEBORAH L. RHODE & .DAVID LUBAN, LEGAL ETHICS
3-12 (2d ed. 1995), distinguishing deontological theories (from Kant's emphasis on
moral duties to Dworkin's emphasis on legal rights), consequentialist theories (from
Bentham's and Mill's emphasis on utility to Posner's "wealth maximization"), and
virtue ethics (from Aristotle to MacIntyre).
123. See generally MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALM THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF

POLITICAL DISCOURSE (1991) (arguing that self-centered preoccupation with personal
rights has undermined social concern).
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based. The traditional moral virtues-justice, prudence, courage,
and fraternity-are viewed as habits or dispositions that are
developed in large part by observing and emulating the character and conduct of admirable people. Virtue develops and occurs
in community, in relationship with others."
We maintain that this approach better conforms to personal
experience. When asked what we believe, most of us explain
ourselves by claiming membership in a family, a group, a religion, a region or a society. As Thomas L. Shaffer has put it,
"[we account for our morals-unintentionally-by naming what
we belong to."" 5 At the moment of moral choice, we rarely engage in the sort of "ethical dilemma" thinking that pervades
teaching of moral and legal ethics--discussion of a moral quandary based on highly abstracted and limited facts. Instead, we
remember or discover who we are through a psychological or
spiritual homecoming. Then, having remembered or discovered
that we belong to a community and are living out a story, we act
as if we were members of that community, engaged in that story. Moral action does not rely on "principles" or "choice" as much
as it does on the commitments of participation in community.
Shaffer said that America is "a society built not on obedience [to
principles] but on participation."" 6 We believe ethics is a similar project.
Stories have an ability to expose self-deception and get at
underlying truths. Storytellers have penetrated the mask of
cultural self-deception, from Andersen's fairy tale about the
emperor's new clothes," 7 to Mark Twain in the nineteenth century, to Harper Lee in our day with the fictional re-creation of
her lawyer-father, Atticus Finch."
124. See MACINTYRE, supra note 54, at 22-34; SHAFFER, supra note 54, at 28-32;
Martha C. Nussbaum, Non-Relative Virtues: An Aristotelian Approach, 13 MIDWEST
STUD. PHIL. 32, 33-34, 45-47 (1988).
125. SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 25.
126. Thomas L. Shaffer, The Legal Ethics of Belonging, 49 OHIO ST. L.J. 703, 707
n.10 (1988) (citing CAROL J. GREENHOUSE, PRAYING FOR JUSTICE 25 (1986)
(attributing this description of the American dream (without citation) to Alexis de
Tocqueville)).
127. See HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE EMPEROR'S NEW CLOTHES (M.R. James
trans., 1971) (describing how two dishonest weavers trick a vain emperor into paying
for an "invisible" set of clothes).
128. See MARK TWAIN, THE ADVENTURES OF HUCKLEBERRY FINN (1884); HARPER
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Good stories have the advantage of relative truthfulness, and
they have the further advantage of showing us how even our
moral heroes are self-deceived. Our moral heroes, like the
Hebrew prophets, see more clearly than those around them,
but still they are in and part of communities [towns, families
and religious congregations] that are deceiving themselves .... The lawyer-hero is, like the prophet Isaiah, a
person of unclean lips, living in the midst of a people of unclean lips. He, like Isaiah, says, "Send me. " "'

3. Commitment and Obligation
Some rules and stories, it turns out, re taken seriously by
officials and enforcement bodies while others receive haphazard
attention and still others are ignored entirely. Equally important, the organized bar and the courts have different priorities
when rules and stories exist in tension with one another. 30
The organized bar, emphasizing the lawyer's duty of zealous
representation to her client, gives a client-protective and clientfulfilling gloss to rules and stories. In the profession's scheme of
things, loyalty to one's client is the cardinal priority. As a result,
the duty of confidentiality has few exceptions. Confidentiality
and client interest subordinate duties to courts, third persons,
and the legal system.
The profession's ideology influences courts and administrative
agencies, but these bodies also draw on other rules and stories,
as well as the broader law of lawyering, in deciding cases. The
law of lawyering that these official bodies expound, albeit cautiously and somewhat ambiguously, takes a broader view of the
profession's public responsibilities and a narrower view of adversarial zeal than do the rules and stories advanced by the organized bar. Lawyers face uncertainty because competing messag-

LEE, To KILL A MOCKINGBIRD (1960).

129. Thomas L. Shaffer, Beyond the Rules: The Responsibility and Role of Continuing Legal Education To Teach Alternative Ethical Considerations, in ARDEN
HOUSE III CONFERENCE, supra note 109, at 493, 513.

130. For a comprehensive discussion of the differing commitments of the organized
bar and public officials, see Koniak, supra note 107.
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es come from the hydra-headed sources of guidance-the organized bar, on one hand, and the enforcing agencies and court, on
the other. The supposedly authoritative sources commit to visions of.lawyering that are largely congruent but have shades of
difference on many matters and direct conflict on some. The
most obvious illustration involves the lawyer's responsibilities
when facts suggest that a client is engaged in prospective or
ongoing fraud.13 1
Law students and practicing lawyers often assume that they
can approach the law and ethics of lawyering just as they do the
law applicable to a client's past conduct, that is, as an advocate
dealing with law that bears on someone else but not on themselves. Law students and lawyers often take a vantage point
from outside the system of law. Law is something that we, as
lawyers, shape, use, support, attack or seek to change on behalf
of clients. Law is "out there," applying to our clients but detached
from us. Lawyers become so accustomed to viewing law in this
abstract manner that they forget that, with respect to the law
that governs lawyers, they are its subjects, not its manipulators.
The law of lawyering gives the law student an opportunity to
understand law as clients do-as a first-person actor within a
system of law rather than as a third-party advisor or advocate.
Understanding the law from this perspective is not only essential to retaining one's license to practice, it is also the best way
of understanding the situation of one's clients, the risks they
face, and the confusion and anger they often feel when confronted with the power and uncertainty of the law.
Lawyers and law students often say, when confronted with
uncertainties in the law governing lawyers, that it is unfair to
penalize conduct in the face of such uncertainty. Yet every day
clients who engage in other activities regulated by law face that
same uncertainty. Lawyers frequently advise clients that, "I
believe you, but there is a risk that the jury may believe the
facts as presented by the opposing party," or that, "I think the
131. For a comprehensive treatment of this challenging subject, see HAZARD ET
AL., supra note 8, at 294-323. See also Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., Lawyers and Client
Fraud: They Still Don't Get It, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcS 701 (1993) (arguing that the
profession's confidentiality rules do not immunize lawyers from liability for participating in client frauds).
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law is on your side, but the judge may take a different view."
Clients have to make decisions under conditions of legal risk
and uncertainty-and they do not like it. The law of lawyering
puts lawyers in that same uncomfortable position, making manifest that we, too, as lawyers and law students, live within a
world of law that shapes our identities and relationships, threatens our disobedience with sanctions, and expresses some sense
of the collective morality of society.
Commitment grows out of the narratives that inspire us and
give meaning to our lives. Yet our narratives must ring true or
we will fall into self-deception. In fashioning a personal story of
what it means to be a good lawyer, problems arise because of
the discrepancy between some of the powerful myths of heroic
lawyers celebrated by the profession and the realities of today's
world.
First, the single most powerful narrative of the American
legal profession is that of "the fearless advocate who champions
a client threatened with loss of life and liberty by government
3 2 Historical events from revolutionary days to
oppression.""
today's headlines repeat and confirm this narrative, and countless movies and television shows celebrate it. A sampling of
historical versions of the narrative includes: Andrew Hamilton's
defense of Peter Zenger, Abe Lincoln's defense of Tom Robinson,
Judge Horton and the Scottsboro case, and Thurgood Marshall's
role in the civil rights movement.' Yet the work of most lawyers today lacks the elements of this narrative: the lawyer acting to protect the life or liberty, usually in a criminal case, of an
innocent individual threatened by governmental oppression.

132. Geoffrey C. Hazard, Jr., The Future of Legal Ethics, 100 YALE L.J. 1239,
1243 (1991). An address by Joseph H. Choate in 1905 provides a classic statement:
To be a priest . . . in the Temple of Justice; to serve at her alter[sic
and aid in her administration; to maintain and defend the inalienable
rights of life, liberty and property upon which the safety of society depends; to succor the oppressed and defend the innocent; to maintain
constitutional rights against all violations . . . ; to rescue the scapegoat
and restore him to his proper place in the world-all this seemed to me
to furnish a field worthy of any man's ambition.
HAZARD ET AL., supra note 8, at 1093 (quoting Joseph H. Choate).
133. For citations concerning these and other narratives of the lawyer as champion of the lonely or oppressed, see Hazard, supra note 132, at 1242-45.
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Today, as Geoffrey Hazard has stated, the lawyer's partisan
endeavors are applied to quite different situations:
The private client is more likely to be a business organization
than an individual; the transaction or proceeding is probably
civil or regulatory rather than criminal; the outcome is more
likely to be a matter of property or money than life or liberty;
and the justice of the cause is probably indeterminate.'3
The lawyer's role defends due process only in the sense that
earlier assumptions about the Constitution's sweeping protection
of property and privacy no longer assure protection from governmental intrusion."5 As the old saw puts it, "the practice of law
deals mostly with the getting and keeping of money." 136 Can
the profession's preference for client interests over the interests
of courts, third persons and the public justify the lawyer's partisan conduct? When a party is unrepresented or poorly represented, the invisible hand of the adversary system cannot maximize
social good. Moreover, most of what lawyers do-counseling in
the law office-does not involve an adverse party. Furthermore,
lawyers conduct many negotiations with unrepresented parties.
In none of these situations does an impartial arbiter ensure
fairness.
Second, the metaphor of the lawyer as a public-spirited statesman, to use Anthony Kronman's concept, 137 sounds a good deal
like the earlier narrative of the lawyer as gentleman-a WASP
aristocrat who was a pillar of his community, a social architect
who practiced noblesse oblige as a moral art.138 In an egalitarian age, this narrative is troublesome because of its connection
with white, male, Protestant social power. It is also troublesome

134. Id. at 1244-45.
135. Compare the breadth of the protection provided to property by the interpretation of the Fourth and Fifth Amendments in Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616,
630 (1886), to the current partial or total rejection of those views in Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The issue is considered in HAZARD ET AL., supra note
8, at 243-56.
136. See Hazard, supra note 132, at 1239 (attributing the phrase to "An Old Lawyer").
137. KRONMAN, supra note 54, at 50-52.
138. See SHAFFER, supra note 23, at 30-97 (discussing and critiquing the influential American concept of lawyer as gentleman).
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because it suggests that lawyers are an elite group with special
responsibilities apart from those of citizens generally. In the age
of equality everyone is to have equal rights and equal duties.
Notions of elitism carry implicit messages of superiority and
paternalism-images of the lawyer as powerful aristocrat. Perhaps we need to rethink our notion of the role of elites as structural elements of a stable, prosperous, and decent society.'39
Third, some bar leaders, seeking to justify restrictions on competition in legal services, rely upon widely shared narratives of
lawyers preying on the plight of the injured or troubled. Real-life
stories of plaintiffs' lawyers rushing to accident scenes and
victims' homes become a metaphor for many lawyers' profound
distaste for the commercial realities of the modern world. They
become arguments for anticompetitive measures that are likely
to harm consumers: attempts to exclude lawyers from outside
the jurisdiction from competing for local business, 40 restrictions
on the flow of information-about the availability and cost of legal
services, 141 and limitations on the provision of useful service by
nonlawyers.' 42 Avoiding "commercialism" is a major theme of
the ABA's efforts over the last decade to regenerate professional
morale and repute. 4 ' Lawyer advertising provides a notable

139. See Hazard, supra note 132 (examining thte possibility that a stable and
prosperous society may require the work of lawyer elites in the protection of property against majoritarian democratic politics).
140. See, e.g., Ranta v. McCarney, 391 N.W.2d 161 (N.D. 1986) (barring an out-ofstate lawyer from recovering legal fees for giving tax and transactional advice to an
in-state client); MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILrY DR 2-101 (1980)

(limiting advertising to "the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or
maintains

offices or in which a significant

part of the lawyer's clientele

re-

sides").
141. See, e.g., MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSBILITY DR 2-101 (1980)
(limiting advertising to "the geographic area or areas in which the lawyer resides or
maintains offices or in which a significant part of the lawyer's clientele resides");
MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 7.2 (1983) (listing restrictions on
advertising).
142. See MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.5 (1995) (prohibiting
unauthorized practice of law, or assisting others in unauthorized practice); MODEL
RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CONDUCT Rule 5.4 (prohibiting partnership between lawyers
and nonlawyers if any of the partnership's activities include practice of law).
"
. . . IN THE SPIRIT OF PUBLIC SER143. See ABA COMM'N ON PROFESSIONALISM,
VICE:" A BLUEPRINT FOR THE REKINDLING OF LAWYER PROFESSIONALISM, reprinted in

112 F.R.D. 243, 276-77 (1986); Robert W. Gordon & William H. Simon, The Redemp-
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a notable symbol for this widespread view.
Competition in legal services serves the needs of consumers
and the public in producing services of reasonable cost, great
variety, and competent quality.'" Competition rests on principles of efficiency and accountability that the profession must and
should honor. Yet recurrent images of "professionalism" assume
that the American virtues of risk-taking, private initiative, and
competitive markets are vices in the practice of law-a view that
does not coincide with either history or reality. " 5 Entrepreneurial character has always pervaded the practice of law. A reshaped narrative needs to accept the benefits of competition in
legal services, welcome accountability to clients, and provide
practical solutions for situations in which competitive forces
cannot provide adequate legal services."'
Another difficulty for students and lawyers in deciding what
kind of lawyer they should commit to being arises from our era's
understanding of law as an indeterminate and almost infinitely
malleable social construct. Traditional legal ethics involves a
tension between lawyers' duties to their clients and lawyers'
duties to courts, third persons, and the legal system. Agency law
and professional codes specify the responsibilities of lawyers to
provide diligent, competent, and loyal representation to clients;
they also constrain lawyers' commitments to clients by requiring
that lawyers act within the bounds of the law, a concept that
includes both the law that is generally applicable to citizens and
the special obligations imposed on lawyers by ethics codes and
procedural rules. " 7

tion of Professionalism?, in LAWYERS' IDEALS/LAWYERS' PRACTICES 230 (Robert L.
Nelson et al. eds. 1992); Nancy L. Moore, Professionalism Reconsidered, 1987 AM. B.
FOUND. RES. J. 773 (reviewing the ABA Report on Professionalism).
144. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramton, The Delivery of Legal Services to Ordinary
Americans, 44 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 531, 564-74 (1994).
145. Id. at 565-78, 610.
146. Id. at 601-12 (1994).
147. A 1958 AALS-ABA report contained a powerful statement of the special obligation of lawyers to maintain the integrity and legitimacy of the legal system. Lon L.
Fuller & John D. Randall, ProfessionalResponsibility: AALS-ABA Joint Conference on
ProfessionalResponsibility, 44 A.B-A. J. 1159, 1162 (1958). A lawyer's efforts for a client, it was said, should not involve means or ends that were inconsistent with the
public purposes of the ethics rules, procedural rules, or institutional arrangements. Id.
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Today's lawyer, however, views the limits on partisan zeal
through the lens of legal realism, which casts doubt upon the
objectivity, consistency, and legitimacy of formal legal rules.
Should a lawyer view the special law governing a lawyer's conduct in the same way that an advocate views legal rules and
precedents that are adverse to the client's position, employing
the tools of analysis, distinction, and argument that whittle
away an unfavorable rule or precedent or expand a favorable
one? Even if a rule's application is relatively clear, should the
lawyer also consider'the practical questions of whether the rule
in question will be enforced in the particular situation? Will the
violation be discovered and be provable? Will someone with
standing to raise the issue pursue the matter? Will an enforcing
agency or court devote resources to it? Will the tribunal impose
a substantial punishment?
When a lawyer considers these issues in the context of a representation, the lawyer acts as a counselor to herself. A wise
counselor deals with the uncertainty of law by staking out a
path, as Brandeis put it, that is on safe ground, well-removed
from the precipice. 48 Conformity to the most basic ethical principles, however, requires more than prudent caution." Simplistically judging "rights" or "wrongs" cannot resolve moral action in complex situations. Moral action requires a nuanced
judgment based on all of the circumstances and relationships.
148. In testifying before a congressional committee about the asserted difficulties
of business clients in dealing with the uncertainties of antitrust law, Brandeis repeated his reply to clients:
"[Y]our lawyers .

.

. can tell you where a fairly safe course lies. If you

are walking along a precipice no human being can tell you how near you
can go to that precipice without falling over, because you may stumble
on a loose stone....

but anybody can tell you where you can walk

perfectly safe within convenient distance of that precipice." The difficulty
which men have felt ... has been rather that they wanted to go to the
limit rather than that they have wanted to go safely.
HAZARDl ET AL., supra note 8, at 57 (quoting Louis D. Brandeis).
149. For a discussion of the legal realism problem, see Jamie G. Heller, Legal
Counseling in the Administrative State: How To Let the Client Decide, 103 YALE L.J.
2503 (1994) (discussing the Zod Baird situation, in which Baird, President Clinton's
nominee for Attorney General, had to explain why she had violated immigration
laws by hiring undocumented aliens as domestic workers); Stephen L. Pepper, Counseling at the Limits of the Law. An Exercise in the Jurisprudence and Ethics of Lawyering, 104 YALE L.J. 1545 (1995) (adopting a multiple-factor virtue analysis).
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Moral discourse with one's client or one's partners may lead to
agreement on a course of action, but it may also lead to a parting of ways. If the client or one's partners or superiors within
the firm determine to push a matter to the limits of law, perhaps even wanting to go beyond them, or if the lawyer is too
rigid in asserting personal moral preferences, both are best
served by the client seeking legal help elsewhere or the lawyer
seeking new employment. The loss of business or employment
may be hard, to put it mildly, but in an unredeemed world,
doing good may be costly.
Conflict and selfishness combined with instances of irresponsibility, incompetence and injustice pervade the world of law practice and the administration of justice. This world is, as our
friend and colleague, Geoffrey Hazard, has said, "a tricky, brutal, and dangerous place, and will remain substantially so, at
least for the foreseeable future, no matter what is done to improve it."5 ' The ethics teacher has the dual task of preparing
students for these harsh realities, without pretending that they
do not exist, while simultaneously motivating each student to be
a good lawyer who also seeks to be a good person. The difficult
and sometimes intractable problems of "things as they are" energize the missionary zeal of a few students, but run the risk of
making cynics of the rest. The legal ethics course is not an easy
course to teach.
The problems raised above do not have simple solutions. It is
not surprising that we disagree with one another on how to approach some of the more difficult questions presented by the
course. We find some solace and common ground, however, in our
convictions that legal ethics focuses on a body of "obligations"
rather than "rights," and that our students need to discover a
vocation that will counsel them as to their obligations in being a
lawyer, just as we have had to discover such a vocation.' 5'
For at least the last four decades, rights, particularly individual rights, have preoccupied legal analysis.'52 Although rights
are important, obligations are equally important but often ne-

150. Hazard, ARDEN HOUSE III CONFERENCE, supra note 109, at 483.
151. See Koniak & Hazard, supra note 63, at 127-28.
152. Id.
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glected. Although obligations are generally correlative of rights,
emphasis on one concept or the other makes a difference. 1 3 Legal thinking today gives pride-of-place to rights: rights define
privilege and status; they dignify and ennoble.'5 4
In this jurisprudential vision, legal obligations are burdens,
the antithesis of rights, things to be avoided when possible
and minimized at all other times. Ethics presents a counterpoint to this vision. Ethics begins with obligation as the central category. In ethics, it is obligation that carries the power
to dignify and ennoble. Obligations are opportunities, not
burdens; they are opportunities to fulfill responsibilities and
thus show oneself worthy to be considered an honored member of some community. Our law does manage to dole out
responsibilities-taxes, tort law and the like-but only in
legal and judicial ethics does it manage to encode the idea of
obligation as opportunity, as dignifying and ennobling responsibility. Without strong correlative obligations, rights are
weak and vulnerable. With its understanding of obligation as
blessing, not burden, legal ethics has much to contribute to
"rights theory" and modem jurisprudential thought."u
Obligations can also provide commitments that can help shape
our aspirations and our character.
III. WHO SHOULD TEACH LEGAL ETHICS: THE COMMITMENT AND
CHARACTER OF THE TEACHER
Inquiring about character is a tricky business in a pluralistic
and diverse society such as ours; particularly within
subcommunities such as the academy, which take particular
pride in honoring freedom of conscience and thought. The fear is
that any such inquiry will amount to nothing more than a
dressed-up political or cultural loyalty test. We understand that
problem. We also understand that writing or speaking about the
character of one's colleagues is no way to win friends and influ-

153. Id.
154. Id.
155. Id.; see Susan P. Koniak, Through the Looking Glass of Ethics and the
Wrong with Rights We Find There, 9 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 1 (1995) (elaborating
the distinction between rights and obligations).
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ence people. Collegiality is a central concept in academic institutions and paradoxically, collegiality requires a certain distance,
a sphere of personal space that is beyond group review. In our
culture, committed as it is to tolerance, liberty and diversity-especially in our peculiar corner of that culture, the law
school-character is a highly personal thing. On the streets of
Brooklyn, talking about another's mother is a highly personal
and thus highly charged event. In the halls of academia, talking
about the character of one's colleagues is similarly personal and
similarly charged.
That explains the silence in the academy on the commitment
and character of those who should teach. But it does not justify
the silence. When asked by Socrates whether virtue could be
taught, Protagoras, in a lengthy reply, affirmed that it could
be.'5 6 His dialogue with Plato emphasizes that virtue is best
taught by example,'5 7 and that to teach virtue one must know
what constitutes virtue.'5 8 We agree. If this is true, the character and moral vision of the ethics teacher, above all other teachers, is of critical importance. If, that is, we seriously want to
create honorable lawyers. How then can we hire or promote in
this field without giving attention to matters of character?
What would it mean to pay attention to such things? What
would we ask? For what characteristics or qualities would we
look? First, we might ask those who desire to teach ethics for an
156. See PLATO, PROTAGORAS 323a-328d (C.C.W. Taylor trans., 1991); see also
Thomas D. Eisele, Must Virtue Be Taught?, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 495 (1987) (arguing
"not only that virtue can be taught, and that it is taught, but that it must be
taught" in law schools).
157. According to one commentator's reading of Protagoras:
Socrates is an example (or exemplar) of virtue or excellence; he enacts or
performs excellence in his incessant questioning and questing. He may
not be able to articulate fully what virtue is-but this only shows perhaps
that virtue is not a matter of propositional knowledge. Socrates is able to
embody it. And his example teaches us what virtue or excellence is. We
learn virtue from his examples.
Eisele, supra note 156, at 497.
158. Eisele noted further:
Socrates knows what virtue is in that he can perform (display) it, and
we too know what it is in that we can recognize it in his actions. Our
knowledge of virtue is shown or revealed either in our ability to act
virtuously or in our ability to recognize virtue in action.
Id. at 498.
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example or two of occasions when they strove to live up to a
principle they profess to be of importance. It is inconceivable to
either of us that anyone whose life is centered by the demands
of virtue would not have such examples. Responding to this type
of question demands a certain kind of courage and trust. The
answer might displease the listeners, and might thereby cost
one a job. To answer, therefore, requires some courage. It also
requires some trust, not only in the questioners, but primarily in
oneself and one's convictions. The query seeks to identify a person of integrity who knows her own identity and allegiances and
lives by those commitments. These are important qualities in
anyone who would profess to teach virtue to another.
Could such an inquiry be abused? Yes. Our faculties, like the
society generally, are divided on many questions of right and
wrong. A majority could penalize a candidate for holding some
vision of virtue that was outside the mainstream view. It might
nonetheless be a worthy vision, for the majority view is not
necessarily the right view. There is no getting around this potentially unjust result. On the other hand, faculties deny jobs to
people all the time because the legal theories they espouse appear bizarre. Who is to say that those judgments are correct?
The real problem in asking about character is not potential
injustice. It is that, by opening up the question of virtue at all,
the line across the personal has been crossed in a way that
makes many of us feel especially vulnerable. But as dangerous
and frightening as these questions are, there is something important for the community to gain from taking questions of character out of the closet. It provides the community with an opportunity to examine what common ground we do share on matters
of right and wrong, and it invites individuals in the community
to question how they live out the virtues they profess to hold. It
makes ethics real and a thing of consequence. It celebrates the
importance of virtue, courage, and conviction. At the risk of
sounding immodest, we have such stories to tell, and we know
many of our colleagues in this field do as well." 9

159. See, e.g., Roger C. Cramtan, On the Steadfastness and Courage of Government Lawyers, 23 J. MARSHALL L. REV. 165 (1990) (describing personal experiences
with the United States Department of Justice); Susan P. Koniak, Feasting While the
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We also have stories that demonstrate our own moral weakness-occasions when we acted without the virtue that we aspire to have. As in the case of moral triumphs, we believe that
anyone who sets virtue as a goal has similar tales of failure.
Although we would not ask a candidate to divulge such failings,
we would consider the acknowledgement of moral imperfection
as a positive trait. Living with human imperfection, exemplified
by instances of failure, is an essential characteristic of a good
professional. All of us make mistakes-we are flawed and imperfect. Inquiry into how professionals live with and learn from
their failures and imperfections has an important role in the
teaching of legal ethics.'
We are serious about these areas of inquiry, which does not
mean that we believe that our suggestion will be adopted. A
more palatable alternative might be to ask the candidate to
describe a moral hero from literature or life. 6' This makes the
inquiry less personal, although it also renders the answer less
informative.
This Article is not meant to resemble a primer on how to hire
professors of legal ethics. Our point, rather, is to invite debate
on the question of character and its role in teaching, particularly
in the teaching of ethics. 6 ' For when all the specific lessons
have been forgotten, the character of the teacher may remain
imprinted upon the student's mind. We take that possibility seriously, which means we keep it in mind whenever we decide to
act within or without the law school environment. It informs our
approach to consulting work and how much of this work to do:
Widow Weeps: Georgine v. Amchem Products, Inc., 80 CORNELL L. REV. 1045, 1045
n.t (1995) (describing her experience testifying as an expert witness in Georgine).
160. See WILLIAM F. MAY, THE PHYSICIAN'S COVENANT: IMAGES OF THE HEALER IN
MEDICAL ETHICS (1983); see generally CHARLES L. BOSK, FORGIVE AND REMEMBER:
MANAGING MEDICAL FAILiJRE (1979) (describing the experiences and teaching of living with failure ixl medicine).
161. See Thomas L. Shaffer, The Moral Theology of Atticus Finch, 42 U. PITT. L.
REV. 181 (1981) (discussing Atticus Finch, the lawyer-hero of Harper Lee's novel, To
Kill a Mockingbird, and depicting the heroism of Atticus Finch as his insistence
upon telling the truth); Thomas L. Shaffer, Growing Up Good in Maycomb, 45 ALA.
L. REV. 531 (1994) (describing the effect of Atticus Finch's example on his children).
162. For an earlier discussion of the desirability and importance of teachers bringing their moral commitments into class discussion, see Colloquy, Beyond the Ordinary Religion, 37 J. LEGAL EDUC. 509 (1987).
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which cases to accept, and which to reject. It informs our posi-

tions on law school matters, from hiring to grading curves. We
recognize that our students watch us to see whether we mean
what we say. Do we mouth principles or mean them? We understand our responsibility to serve as examples. We encourage our
colleagues to demand no less of the ethics teachers at their
schools and no less of themselves.
One might ask whether we have moved dangerously close to
advocating some form of moral zealotry, some unhealthy righteousness that can only lead to extremism and intolerance. In a
recent book on the legal profession, Anthony Kronman of Yale
warned against the danger of moral zealotry by citizens of a
democracy and, in particular, among lawyers. 6 ' He set up a
vision of virtue in lawyering and in law teaching based upon the
lawyer role he refers to as the "lawyer-statesman.""' The
lawyer-statesman is that person who, almost above all other
qualities, understands that no right or wrong exists on questions
of intense public debate such as abortion and the death penalty-two examples mentioned by Kronman." Moral complexity
and the incommensurability of values, Kronman argued, necessitate a pragmatic posture. 66 Because "justice" is an
"intractabl[e]" and "controversial" subject, the lawyer-statesman
need have no vision of justice other than as a description of process-outcomes and a commitment to efficient case management.6 7 "Political fraternity" replaces justice as the ultimate

163. KRONMAN, supra note 54.
164. See id. passim.
165. See id. at 59-62.
166. Id. at 61-62.
167. See id. at 107-08. Kronman discusses "justice" at two points in The Lost
Lawyer. First, Kronman states that justice is such an "intractably controversial" topic that it "provides little guidance in resolving the endless controversies" of today's
world; an emphasis on political fraternity, he states, is required "precisely because
these concepts [of liberty and justice] are so controversial." Id The second discussion
of justice criticizes the instrumental concept of managerial judging because it "reinforces the tendency of judges to view the claims before them as commensurable." Id.
at 342. Because, in Kronman's view, the incommensurability of values makes justice
meaningless, the lawyer-statesman's virtues largely reduce themselves to prudence,
public-mindedness, and political fraternity. See id. at 340-41. Because Kronman places so much emphasis on conciliation and compromise as aspects of the lawyer-statesman, he inevitably suggests that adversarial advocacy, confrontation, and conflict are
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virtue.'8
Kronman's book contrasts his lawyer-statesman with two
unacceptable moral alternatives: the lawyer as hired gun'6 9
and the lawyer as moral zealot. 7 ° We have great sympathy for
Kronman's critique of the morality of the hired gun role, but we
part company with him on his denunciation of those he calls
zealots and his embrace of the statesman alternative.
We try to teach our students that there is dignity and morality
171
in the role that Kronman mocks with the title of "zealot."
Kronman details no lives of lawyer-statesmen in his book. He
provides no concrete examples of the virtues he would have lawyers emulate. He does, however, provide a list of lawyers who
qualify as statesmen/heroes.
Kronman's list includes John
McCloy and Dean Acheson.171 McCloy, at least, does not make
our list, which includes instead Thurgood Marshall and Charles
Hamilton Houston, two lawyers, one also a judge and the other a
law teacher, who strove mightily and at great personal risk to
move society forward, to bring a new understanding of justice
into the world. The judge/hero on Kronman's list is Justice Robert Jackson. 74 While Justice Jackson is a name, unlike
Acheson or McCloy, that might figure prominently on many an
academic's list of heroes, he too is not on Susan's list. (Roger,
who is perhaps more accepting of human frailty, continues a
perverse admiration for Jackson's flawed virtue.) Instead, Susan
admires Justice Murphy, who spoke out clearly and eloquently
against the racism that caused this country to lock up its Japanese citizens during World War II (and Roger shares this admi-

inappropriate, even though the short-term use of these measures may serve longterm interests of political community and harmony. See id. at 334. Martin Luther
King, Jr., Thurgood Marshall, and the civil rights movement come to ,mind.
168. Id. at 108.
169. See id. at 113-34, 146-54. Kronman criticizes this model under the rubric of
the "narrow view of what counselors and advocates do." Id. at 122. Under this narrow view, the lawyer "will end up doing what his client wants in every case and
feeling no qualms about it." Id. at 145.
170. Id. at 144-46.
171. See, e.g., id. at 161.
172. Id. at 11-12.
173. Id. at 11.
174. Id.
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ration retrospectively, having learned from his own failures). 7 5
Jackson, the statesman, was more concerned with keeping the
Court clear of the matter than with the plight of his fellow citizens. 6 This, to us, fails to reach heroic proportions.
What Kronman denounces as moral zealotry, we understand
as moral conviction. One with conviction, however, can be
wrong. This danger, and what Kronman sees as the natural
tendency of moral conviction to lead to ruthlessness, cause him
to denounce conviction. 7 What then of these dangers? The
caricature of zealotry that Kronman paints surely raises both
questions. His zealot is a simpleton, charging forth while ignoring the opposing commitments of others or the complexity of
moral choice, ignoring the details. This is not a prophet but an
idiot, a fool.
Any thoughtful person who aspires to bring justice into the
world must understand that the world punishes its prophets; so
we teach our students. The world does not embrace those who
would disturb it and unsettle the settled conditions that make
life comfortable for those who are comfortable. False or true,
prophets face derision and danger. No prophet can assume her
role mindless of its costs or the opposing commitments that
make the role so costly. That understanding provides a natural
check on prophecy. Only when one is most sure of one's convictions is it sensible to act. Only after careful thought and immersion in detail would one dare take on the costs of becoming a
prophet. The only exception is if one is a lunatic, but lunatics by
themselves pose little threat, for they need the cooperation of
others (perhaps statesmen?) to cause true harm.
As for ruthlessness, prophecy has a long tradition. The mythology and teaching of that tradition is that the most noble

175. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
176. Id. at 242 (Jackson, J., dissenting).
177. KRONMAN, supra note 54, at 104. Kronman argues that "an idealistic commitment to some narrow and exclusive conception of the human good" tends to lead to
ruthlessness. Id. Kronman's lawyer-statesman avoids ruthlessness because, recognizing the incommensurability of values, he values political fraternity above any vision
of justice. Id. Kronman's "ideal is an essentially conservative one" that recognizes "to

a degree no moral zealot can, the irreconcilable diversity of human goods" and is
"comfortable with strategies of compromise and delay." Id. at 161.
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prophets offer their own bodies in the name of their vision of
justice before harming those who oppose them. Christ, Ghandi,
and Martin Luther King, Jr. are the most notable exemplars of
this tradition. But other, less famous, figures also demonstrate
the same point. In teaching students the morality of prophecy,
the idea that those who struggle for humanity must put humanity first is and must be a central theme. First, do no harm. Second, strive to do good. Those are central themes of our lives as
we strive to live them.
Indeed, we believe that Kronman got it backwards when he
argued that the statesman role he celebrated is the surest guard
against ruthlessness.'7 8 Because statesmen must proceed on
the presumption that present conditions are not so terrible, that
currently existing society is not so unjust, corrupt or violent,
they begin with a blindness to the pain of those who have been
or are now the victims of society's great wrongs: for example,
blacks, women or the homeless. The pain of these groups cannot
be so great because society is not so bad, or so the statesman
must believe. This picture of the ruthless statesman is no mere
abstraction. Justice Jackson, for example, refused to stand up
boldly against the wrong in Korematsu v. United States79 and
had great difficulty making up his mind8 0 in Brown v. Board
of Education.'' As Robert Cover asked, why do we revere this
man? 82 Perhaps more importantly, why do we not revere
someone like Justice Murphy?
One of the names cited by Dean Kronman as an exemplar of
statesmanship was John J. McCloy.'" John McCloy, Assistant
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Secretary of War during World War II, took the position in 1944
that the United States armed services should not use its resources to bomb the crematoria at Auschwitz nor to bomb the
railroad tracks in Poland, tracks leading the Jews of Hungary to
slaughter.' At the time, McCloy already had in hand ample
evidence of the horror of the Nazi camps." After the war,
when even more evidence of the atrocities was available to
McCloy and all the world, McCloy asked a representative of the
World Jewish Congress whether he really believed the Germans
did such terrible things.'86 Even then, McCloy seemed incapable of believing that civilized people could do such wrong-the
blindness of a statesman. McCloy pardoned Krupp, who had
been convicted of war crimes for using Jewish slave labor to
make a fortune.'87 McCloy not only pardoned Krupp, but returned Krupp's property to him-assets made on the bodies of
tortured and murdered Jews.'" McCloy actively supported the
internment of the Japanese in our country, going to such lengths
as to distort the record presented to the Supreme Court in
Korematsu to ensure that the Court would uphold the internment.'89 In 1981, after the nation had repudiated its treatment
of Japanese citizens during World War II,'" this aged statesman faced two options. McCloy could either admit that he had
erred in supporting and lying about the Japanese internment
project or continue to rationalize his conduct. He chose the latter
path, testifying before Congress in 1981 that the internment was
justified as retribution for Pearl Harbor.' 9 ' He thus further disgraced himself. Should he serve as a model?
In The PresentAge, Kierkegaard told the following story:
If the jewel which every one desired to possess lay far out on
a frozen lake where the ice was very thin, watched over by
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the danger of death, while closer in, the ice was perfectly
safe, then in a passionate age the crowds would applaud the
courage of the man who ventured out, they would tremble for
him and with him in the danger of his decisive action, they
would grieve over him if he were drowned, they would make
a god of him if he secured the prize. But in an age without
passion, in a reflective age, it would be otherwise. People
would think each other clever in agreeing that it was unreasonable and not even worth while to venture so far out. And
in this way they would transform daringand enthusiasm into
a feat of skill, so as to do something, for after all "something
must be done." The crowds would go out to watch from a safe
place, and with the eyes of connoisseurs appraise the accomplished skater who could skate almost to the very edge (i.e.
as far as the ice was still safe and the danger had not yet
begun) and then turn back. The most accomplished skater
would manage to go out to the furthermost point and then
perform a still more dangerous-looking run, so as to make the
spectators hold their breath and say: 'Ye Gods! How mad; he
is risking his life.'1
And the jewel would remain untouched. We aspire to teach our
students that to live a moral life is to strive for the jewel and
that to dare in doing so is to go where the danger is greatest.
We pray on behalf of our students and all those whose lives our
students will touch that these young lawyers will someday have
such courage. We thank God for the courage God has given us
and for the blessing God has conferred on us by allowing us to
strive to serve as examples.
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